Page 83 - Alex Ferguson: My Autobiography
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two European Cups with different clubs. Could he reshape Real Madrid in his own image, to his own
  thinking? From the beginning, there seemed little prospect of him abandoning his most sacred ideas in
  favour of all-out attack and celebrity exuberance. He knew that wasn’t the way to succeed in modern
  football. Barcelona would attack beautifully, but they would also hound the ball when possession was

  lost. They were a hard-working unit, a collective. In that spell when Real reached three Champions
  League finals in five years, they had the best players: Zidane, Figo, Roberto Carlos. Fernando Hierro,
  Iker Casillas in goal, Claude Makélélé sitting in the middle of the park to break everything up.
     They  stayed  with  the  galáctico  system  after  that,  importing  Dutch  players  en  masse,  and  David
  Beckham, Van Nistelrooy, Robinho, but the European Cup eluded them after the Glasgow final of
  2002.  Mourinho  proved  he  could  make  big  teams  win,  but  the  question  I  wanted  answering  was
  whether he would be allowed to do it his way in Madrid.

     José was a pragmatist, no question. The starting point in his philosophy is to make sure his team
  don’t lose. Against Barcelona in the previous season’s Champions League semi-final, he knew his
  Inter side were going to cede 65 per cent of possession. All teams knew that. Barcelona’s policy was
  to ensure they were always overloaded in the midfield area. If you played four there, they would field
  five, if you played six, they would up the ante to seven. By doing so they could rotate the ball, in and
  out to the back four. You would end up on their carousel, going round and round, and wind up dizzy.

  Occasionally you might fall on the ball. Watch a carousel and you will see what I mean. The eyes go
  woozy.
     So José knew Inter would not see much of the ball against Barcelona, but he had weapons of his
  own, mainly concentration and positioning. Esteban Cambiasso, his central midfielder, was a vital
  component in that Inter team. If Messi appeared over here, so would Cambiasso. Should Messi pop
  up in another area, Cambiasso would be there as well. It sounds easy, but as part of a general team
  plan in which all the defensive duties would connect, it was marvellously effective. Later, I watched

  a Real Madrid game in which José made three substitutions in the last 15 minutes. They were all
  defensive in nature, to make sure he won the game.
     But all this came much later than our battles in the middle of the decade, when Chelsea won their
  first League title for 50 years and retained it 12 months later, in the summer of 2006. If 2004–05 was
  a horrible season, with no trophies, the following year brought only the League Cup. A new team was
  growing, but I was not to know we could win three Premier League trophies in a row.

     Our  strategy  was  to  rebuild  for  the  eventual  departures  of  Keane,  Giggs,  Scholes  and  Neville.
  Three of them stayed beyond that plan, while Keane had to go. The intention was to assemble a group
  of  young  players  who  could  develop  over  a  number  of  years,  with  the  experience  of  Giggs  and
  Scholes  and  Neville  to  assist  that  process.  Now  I  can  look  back  on  that  policy  as  an  unqualified
  success.
     Yes, we had a barren season in 2004–05, losing the FA Cup final to Arsenal in a penalty shoot-out,
  but I could see the promise, in that showpiece game, of Rooney and Ronaldo. They toasted Arsenal

  that day. We had 21 shots at goal. In the Champions League round of 16, we lost 1–0 home and away
  to Milan, with Hernán Crespo scoring both goals. Rebuilding held no terrors for me. It was second
  nature. A football club is like family. Sometimes people leave. In football, sometimes they have to,
  sometimes  you  want  them  to,  sometimes  there  is  no  choice  for  either  side,  when  age  or  injury
  intervene.
     I did feel sentimental about great players leaving us. At the same time, my eye would always be on

  a player who was coming to an end. An internal voice would always ask, ‘When’s he going to leave,
  how long will he last?’ Experience taught me to stockpile young players in important positions.
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