Page 151 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

136 Chapter 7

the relaxed media relations of her predecessor, Wahid, and regular meetings with
“ordinary people,” Megawati, from the start, worked to avoid all direct contact with
journalists and any situation involving unscripted public discussion. One of her
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first acts was to eliminate the post of presidential spokesperson. Then in late January
2002, the palace issued a formal ban on “door-stop interviews” with their impromptu
questioning of the president and vice president. Instead, journalists wishing to ask a
question would now have to submit a formal request in advance.
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Commenting on the ban, communications professor Muhammad Budhyatna
said, “If she thinks she does not need the press anymore, the media will not help
her when she makes a wrong move that could be fatal. They will have a field day
deriding her.” At a March seminar, former Tempo editor Goenawan Mohamad pre-
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dicted, “I am afraid another attempt will be made to reduce press freedom.” But the
same media that had once scurried for safety “like a crab” under Suharto’s rule had
since undergone a fundamental transformation. If the government were to attempt
a crackdown, Mohamad warned, “there is no alternative but to fight again, and we
are ready.”
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Instead of direct confrontation, the media pursued a succession of financial scan-

dals that slowly transformed Megawati’s public image from reformasi hero to grasping
politician. In contrast to the high drama of Baligate and Buloggate II, which combined
wholesale theft with electoral manipulation, Megawati’s administration featured mid-
range graft for personal gain.
Typical of these controversies was the Banpres scandal, or Banpresgate, which
emerged in February 2001 when Megawati’s rivals raised questions about a Rp30 bil-
lion “donation” to a military housing project. Djamal Doa of the opposition United
Development Party, who served on the DPR’s budget and finance commission,
had been the first to raise questions, taking the matter directly to the press.
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On March 26, Doa told the entire press corps of his plans to submit a summons
request to DPR leaders. The following day, however, after consulting with col-
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leagues in his party, Doa spoke to the media to do damage control for Megawati in
close collaboration with PDIP. The state secretary, Bambang Kesowo, explained that
the Rp30 billion donation had come out of a “defunct” presidential assistance pro-
gram called Banpres (Bantuan Presiden). With this explanation, Doa withdrew his
summons request. Nonetheless, questions reverberated in the media, tarnishing
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Megawati’s reputation.
Two years of such coverage eroded Megawati’s political capital. In the run-up
to the July 2004 presidential election—the first direct election of a president in
the country’s history—one op-ed observed, “A day does not go by without [media
attacks on the shortcomings] of Megawati’s administration ranging from alleged
corruption to treacherously neglecting the reform movement.” Consequently, in
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the April 2004 parliamentary elections, Golkar made a surprising comeback, taking
the lead at nearly 22 percent of the vote, with Megawati’s PDIP following at a close
second at 18.5 percent. But with the switch to a direct presidential election, strong
showings for individual parties no longer translated into a clear lead for a party’s
chosen candidate.
By the time of Indonesia’s presidential election in July, a dark-horse candidate,
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from the small party Partai Demokrat, President Wahid’s
former security minister, surged ahead of rivals, winning in a run-off race that Octo-
ber and delivering “a shocking defeat” for Megawati and her party. For a fourth
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time during these first five years of transition, media exposure of scandal had played