Page 109 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 109 of 237

For the bear was loose in the banana groves, all right. To maintain his power, Arbenz turned more and more to the
Communists. Just as there is debate over whether Castro started out a Communist or became one later, there has
been some dispute over the political evolution of Arbenz. But there is little dispute that by 1954 the Communists
were running Guatemala. They had gained a foothold and a base in the hemisphere.

Arbenz made one fatal mistake, however. He trusted the Guatemalan Army, an essentially peace- loving
organization little inclined to unnecessary strife and combat. Unlike Castro, Arbenz did not penetrate the Army
politically, and when he needed it most, it turned on him. Late in the game he had placed spies, popularly known
as orejas (the Ears), in various Army posts, but it was too late.

He made one other big mistake -- he expropriated 225,000 acres of United Fruit's best Pacific-slope holdings.
Later the Arbenz regime charged that the United States had supported the Castillo-Armas invasion to protect la
Frutera's $40,000,000 investment in Guatemala.

In the era of the Cold War, keeping Soviet power and influence out of the hemisphere, and particularly out of the
Panama Canal area, was far more important to Washington than old-style banana diplomacy. But certainly the
seizure of United Fruit's holdings without adequate compensation forced Eisenhower to take action. And it was
one more indication of the direction things were taking in Guatemala.

Although a shipment of Czech arms to Guatemala in May, 1954, was later widely cited as the reason for the CIA-
organized coup, the fact is that the machinery to topple Arbenz had been set in motion long before that.