Page 135 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 135 of 237

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT -- THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE DIA, the newest member of the Invisible Government and the most powerful competitor of the CIA, owes
its existence to the post-Sputnik "missile gap" controversy of the late 1950s.

As the Soviets demonstrated the range and accuracy of their missiles in a series of spectacular space shots, the Air
Force demanded that the United States embark on a massive ICBM program of its own. Almost weekly in the
period between 1957 and 1960 the Air Force went before the United States Intelligence Board to argue that the
Russians were deploying hundreds of ICBMs and were tipping the military balance of power in their favor.

To substantiate the claim, Air Force photo-interpreters introduced scores of pictures taken by the U-2 spy plane,
which started to fly over the Soviet Union in 1956.

"To the Air Force every flyspeck on film was a missile," a CIA man remarked scornfully. Allen Dulles,
relying on the independent interpretation of the photos by the CIA's Research Division, challenged two thirds of
the Air Force estimates.

USIB's meetings were dominated by long and bitter arguments over the conflicting missile estimates. The
situation reflected the perennial problem of interservice rivalry. Each service tended to adopt a self-serving party
line and pursue it relentlessly. At budget time each year the Air Force would see endless numbers of Soviet
missiles and bombers; the Navy would detect the latest enemy submarines just off the East Coast; and the
Army would mechanize a few dozen more Russian divisions.

Overwhelmed by the constant bickering, USIB and the civilian leaders of the Pentagon were anxious to find some
mechanism for resolving the conflict. They turned the problem over to a Joint Study Group which was set up in
1959 to conduct a sweeping investigation of the intelligence community.

The group was composed of military men, active and retired, and career intelligence officials in the State
Department, the Defense Department and the White House. It was headed by Lyman Kirkpatrick, then the
inspector general of the CIA. A polio victim who was confined to a wheel chair, Kirkpatrick was often spotted
overseas, pursuing his many investigations.

The Joint Study Group submitted a comprehensive list of recommendations late in 1960. One of the most
important called for the creation of the DIA and for the removal of the service intelligence agencies from USIB.
The DIA was to serve as the arbiter of the conflicting service estimates and to present its findings to USIB as the
final judgment of the Pentagon.

The idea appealed strongly to Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the last Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower
Administration. When the Kennedy Administration took office in January, 1961, Gates forcefully urged
McNamara to put the recommendation into effect without delay.

McNamara was quickly persuaded of the wisdom of Gates' advice. After a thorough study of the missile-gap
claims, McNamara concluded that there was no foundation in the argument that the United States was
lagging behind the Soviet Union in the production or deployment of ICBMs. The study convinced him of the
dangers inherent in the fragmented intelligence operation at the Pentagon. He saw great value in subordinating the
service intelligence branches to a centralized agency directly under his supervision.

Accordingly, McNamara recommended the speedy creation of the DIA. But Dulles balked at the idea. Despite his
many wrangles with the services, Dulles felt it was imperative that they continue to have a voice in the