Page 170 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 170 of 237

Friction between Foreign Service men and CIA operatives became so pronounced by the end of the Eisenhower
Administration, that President Eisenhower issued an executive order in November of 1960, stating: "The several
chiefs of the United States diplomatic missions in foreign countries, as the representatives of the President and
acting on his behalf, shall have and exercise, to the extent permitted by law and in accordance with instructions as
the President may from time to time promulgate, affirmative responsibility for coordination and supervision over
the carrying out by agencies of their functions in the respective countries."

The Eisenhower order seemed, on the surface, to re-establish the ambassador's supremacy over all United States
agencies operating overseas. But many were troubled by the possibility of secret "instructions" to the CIA
circumventing the ambassador's authority.

When President Kennedy entered office, he took prompt action to reaffirm the powers of the State Department
and the ambassadors. On May 29, 1961, Kennedy sent a letter to all ambassadors:

You are in charge of the entire United States diplomatic mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all
of its operations. The mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the
Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or
activities in [name of country]. I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your
assignment.

Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies are expected to communicate directly with their
offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may
ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington.

However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully informed of their views and activities and to abide
by your decisions unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary.

The moving force behind Kennedy's letter was Chester Bowles, then Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs. In the summer of 1961 Bowles set out on a round-the-world trip to explain the new arrangement. A
fifteen-man team, including leading representatives of the State Department, the CIA and the AID, accompanied
Bowles to seven regional meetings with ambassadors and their staffs.

Bowles told the meetings that the ambassadors were to be kept fully informed on all CIA operations and were to
receive copies of all CIA messages to Washington. At each meeting the CIA men would express skepticism:
What, they asked, about situations in which ambassadors do not understand the CIA's special problems?

Let us know, Bowles replied, and we'll get new ones.

Do we tell the ambassador the sources of our information? the CIA men asked incredulously. Yes, Bowles
answered, the ambassador should be in a position to cross-check information if he runs across one of the
informants at a diplomatic function.

The CIA appealed for permission to circumvent the ambassador in "overriding circumstances." But Bowles said
no, and a year later, when he made a check of each United States embassy, he received not a single complaint or
comment from the CIA. The new system, Bowles concluded, was working well.

But a different impression was gained by a staff of experts sent on a world-wide inspection late in 1962 by the
Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Senate Government Operations Committee.
The experts concluded that the Kennedy letter was a "shadow" and had not been interpreted as covering the CIA.
Ambassadors were still unable to give orders to the CIA or to stop an agency operation. The only evident change