Page 18 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 18 of 237

Premier. But Artime broke with Castro later that year and fled Cuba in a boat. Now, at twenty-eight and violently
anti-Castro, he was the secretary general in Miami of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario, the MRR.

Another Cuban leader contacted by the CIA early in the planning stage was Manuel Antonio de Varona, former
Premier of Cuba under President Carlos Prio Socarras, the man Batista had overthrown.

By the end of May, 1960, five exile groups had been organized as a revolutionary frente, or front, with Varona as
coordinator.*

At a meeting in New York, the CIA promised financial support to the newly formed frente. Bender dispatched
agents into Miami. The CIA began pumping what eventually became millions of dollars into the frente and its
successor, the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The CIA funds were deposited in a Miami bank and drawn by the
frente through checks signed by an accountant named Juan Paula.

The first exiles were being recruited for the training camps. In the back streets of downtown Miami, in the bars,
hotels, old rooming houses and apartments of the Cuban refugee community, the exciting word began to spread
that something big was afoot.

Sometimes their leaders flew to New York for conferences with the CIA. When there was a crisis, Bender would
fly to Miami.

The news would pass among the exile community: "Mr. B. is coming."

***

In May of 1960, less than a month after Davis had approached Alejos, the first Cubans arrived at Helvetia. The
detachment of thirty-two men had entered Guatemala as "surveying engineers." At Helvetia they were trained as
communications experts.

Alejos already had radio facilities for communication with the rest of the ranch; these were now greatly expanded
by the CIA and installed in a warehouse near the main building.

The first group of Cubans lived comfortably in the Alejos guest house. But as more trainees flowed into Helvetia,
the Trax Base was built on the mountainside, with barracks completed in June. The base was also known by its
code name, "Vaquero," which means cowboy in Spanish. As cover for the entire operation, the Guatemalan Army
allowed Alejos to train 400 Guatemalan troops at the ranch. They doubled as armed guards to keep potential
snoopers and the 1,300 coffee workers out of the Trax area. CIA instructors, as well as logistics and accounting
officials from the agency, were also housed at the base.

In addition to Helvetia, training took place at two other sites. Alejos owned a sugar plantation at San Jose Buena
Vista, halfway between Retalhuleu and Guatemala City. The terrain proved excellent for parachute jump training
and mass maneuvers. Amphibious landings were practiced on the Pacific coast below Retalhuleu.

In July the CIA began construction of a secret airstrip at Retalhuleu. The existing strip there was inadequate for
the C-46s, C-54s and B-26s that would be brought in. The airstrip contract was awarded to Thompson-Cornwall,
Inc., a big American construction firm with offices in the Chrysler Building in New York. The firm, already in
operation in Guatemala, had the necessary heavy equipment available in the area.