Page 67 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 67 of 237

"Throughout the spring the Central Intelligence reports said that the North Koreans might at any time decide to
change from isolated raids to a full-scale attack. The North Koreans were capable of such an attack at any time,
according to the intelligence, but there was no information to give any clue as to whether an attack was certain or
when it was likely to come." [7]

As the UN forces regained the initiative in Korea, the next major question faced by the CIA (and MacArthur) was
whether Communist China would intervene if UN troops pushed north to the Yalu River. The question became
crucial just about the time Truman replaced Hillenkoetter with Walter Bedell Smith.

In his memoirs, Truman, again, has shed some light on this:

"On October 20 * the CIA delivered a memorandum to me which said that they had reports that the Chinese
Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu
River which provided them with power." [8]

Truman's account was backed up by Allen Dulles eight years later: "I can speak with detachment about the 1950
Yalu estimates, for they were made just before I joined the CIA. The conclusions of the estimators were that it
was a toss-up, but they leaned to the side that under certain circumstances the Chinese probably would not
intervene. In fact, we just did not know what the Chinese Communists would do, and we did not know how far
the Soviet Union would press them or agree to support them if they moved." [9]

It seems reasonably clear, therefore, that the CIA did not, initially, predict the massive Chinese intervention that
occurred.

However, some two weeks later, in November, according to Truman, the CIA did warn that Communist China
had 200,000 troops in Manchuria and that their entry into Korea might push the UN forces back. Truman also
wrote that MacArthur had launched his ill-fated home-by-Christmas offensive on November 24 despite the CIA
summary made available to the general that very day. The summary, Truman went on to say, had warned that the
Chinese were strong enough to force the UN armies back into defensive positions.

Truman, who had been gingerly dealing with MacArthur almost as with another chief of state, at last fired the
general on April 9, 1951. Testifying at the Senate inquiry into his dismissal, MacArthur cast new confusion over
the CIA's role by saying that "in November" the CIA said "there was little chance of any major intervention on the
part of the Chinese forces." If the CIA ever made any such optimistic report in November, replied Truman, it was
news to him.

Bogota and Korea raised, but did not answer, the fundamental question of how much should be expected of the
CIA in its forecasting role. They also set a pattern that has since become familiar -- when trouble came, the overt,
political officers of the visible government almost invariably would say they had no advance warning. The CIA in
turn would say it had provided adequate warning. The public would be left to take its choice, provided it could
weave its way through the maze of self-serving semantics from both sides.

***

1952: Air-Drops Over Red China

During the Korean War, another war was waged in secret against Communist China. On November 23, 1954, a
broadcast from Peking announced the capture and sentencing of two Americans, John Thomas Downey and
Richard George Fecteau.