Page 76 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 76 of 237

questions seemed designed to explore whether the CIA had known all along that the invasion was coming. If this
had been the case, Secretary Dulles could ill afford, for political reasons, to say so.

But Jackson's question and the Secretary of State's answer are on the record. Dulles was clearly saying that "the
executive branch of the government" -- which of course includes the CIA -- had "no knowledge" in advance of the
Israeli attack which began the Suez invasion.

The truth is always elusive; the truth about a secret agency doubly so. Future historians of the Cold War will have
an unenviable task.

***

1956: Costa Rica

The Invisible Government's activities have not been restricted to chaotic countries, dominated or threatened by
Communism. In the mid-1950s CIA agents intruded deeply into the political affairs of Costa Rica, the most stable
and democratic republic in Latin America. Knowledgeable Costa Ricans were aware of the CIA's role. The CIA's
purpose was to promote the ouster of Jose (Pepe) Figueres, the moderate socialist who became President in a fair
and open election in 1953.

In March of 1954, in the course of a Senate speech, Senator Mansfield cited a newspaper report [14] to the effect
that "a CIA man was caught red-handed" in the "tapping of the telephone of Jose Figueres ... I do not need to
point out the tremendous impact which this sort of activity could have in our foreign policy," he said, in calling
for tighter Congressional control over the CIA. His warning had no noticeable effect on the CIA's anti-Figueres
activities, however.

Figueres had risen to national prominence as the leader of a guerrilla movement organized to install Otilio Ulate
as President in 1948. Ulate had won the election, but a right-wing government (with Communist support) and a
packed legislature had refused to recognize him. In April of 1948, however, Figueres forced them to back down
and the following year Ulate was installed.

Figueres' success vaulted him into the presidency in 1953. But Ulate organized an opposition movement against
his former political ally.

Local CIA agents joined in the efforts to unseat Figueres. Their major grievance was that Figueres had
scrupulously recognized the right of asylum in Costa Rica -- for non-Communists and Communists alike. The
large influx of questionable characters complicated the agency's job of surveillance and forced it to increase its
staff.

The CIA's strategy was twofold: to stir up embarrassing trouble within the Communist Party in Costa Rica, and to
attempt to link Figueres * with the Communists. An effort to produce evidence that Figueres had been in contact
with leading Communists during a trip to Mexico was unsuccessful. But CIA agents had better luck with the first
part of their strategy -- stirring up trouble for the Communists. They succeeded in planting a letter in a
Communist newspaper. The letter, purportedly from a leading Costa Rican Communist, put him on record in
opposition to the Party line on the Hungarian revolution.

Unaware that the letter was a CIA plant, the leading officials in the American Embassy held an urgent meeting to
ponder its meaning. The political officer then dispatched a long classified report to Washington, alerting top
policy makers to the possibility of a startling turn in Latin American Communist politics.