Page 91 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 91 of 237

Throughout that month Jakarta reported a series of rebel air attacks against the central government, but it was not
until April 30 that the United States was implicated. Premier Djuanda Kartawidjaja then asserted that he had proof
of "overt foreign assistance" to the rebels in the form of planes and automatic weapons.

"As a consequence of the actions taken by the United States and Taiwan adventurers," Djuanda
commented, "there has emerged a strong feeling of indignation amongst the armed forces and the people of
Indonesia against the United States and Taiwan. And if this is permitted to develop it will only have a
disastrous effect in the relationships between Indonesia and the United States."

Sukarno accused the United States of direct intervention and warned Washington "not to play with fire in
Indonesia ... let not a lack of understanding by America lead to a third war ...

"We could easily have asked for volunteers from outside," he declared in a slightly veiled allusion to a secret offer
of pilots by Peking. "We could wink an eye and they would come. We could have thousands of volunteers, but we
will meet the rebels with our own strength."

On May 7, three days after the fall of Bukittinggi,* the Indonesian military command charged that the rebels had
been supplied weapons and ammunition with the knowledge and direction of the United States. The military
command cited an April 3 telegram to the Revolutionary Government from the "American Sales Company" of
San Francisco. Robert Hirsch, head of the company, confirmed that he had offered to sell the arms to the rebels
but said he had done so without clearing it with the State Department. In any case, he said, the arms were of
Italian make and none had been delivered.

The State Department flatly denied the accusation, and the New York Times editorialized indignantly on May 9:

"It is unfortunate that high officials of the Indonesian Government have given further circulation to the false
report that the United States Government was sanctioning aid to Indonesia's rebels. The position of the United
States Government has been made plain, again and again. Our Secretary of State was emphatic in his declaration
that this country would not deviate from a correct neutrality. The President himself, in a news conference,
reiterated this position but reminded his auditors, and presumably the Indonesians, that this government has no
control over soldiers of fortune ...

"It is always convenient for a self-consciously nationalistic government to cry out against 'outside interference'
when anything goes wrong. Jakarta ... may have an unusually sensitive conscience. But its cause is not promoted
by charges that are manifestly false ...

"It is no secret that most Americans have little sympathy for President Sukarno's 'guided democracy' and his
enthusiasm to have Communist participation in his government ...

"But the United States is not ready ... to step in to help overthrow a constituted government. Those are the hard
facts. Jakarta does not help its case, here, by ignoring them."

The following week, one day after the United States officially proposed a cease-fire, Allen Pope was shot down
while flying for the rebels and the CIA. However, the Indonesian Government withheld for nine days the fact that
an American pilot had been captured. On May 18 it announced only that a rebel B-26 had been shot down.

Nevertheless, with Pope in Indonesian hands things began to move rapidly in Washington. Within five days: (1)
the State Department approved the sale to Indonesia for local currency of 37,000 tons of sorely needed rice; (2)
the United States lifted an embargo on $1,000,000 in small arms, aircraft parts and radio equipment -- destined for