Page 444 - Magistrates Conference 2019
P. 444
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character, but whether she correctly directed the jury in relation to the relevance of the appellant's character to his
credibility. He insisted that it was settled law that a positive credibility direction is required in a case such as this. The
judge therefore, misdirected the jury.
(c) Respondent's Detailed Submissions
166. The appellant's previous convictions meant that he could not be regarded as being of good character. They were
recent and repeated and involved breaches of court orders. Although they may have fallen short of establishing that he
would take risks (especially when intoxicated) they were not irrelevant. The appellant may have been fortunate to have
been given a direction in the terms set out by the judge. Although Mr Whittam accepted that the credibility limb of the
direction was expressed in the negative as opposed to the positive, he said that that of itself should not render the
appellant's conviction unsafe. The fact that trial counsel did not raise any complaint at the time may be thought to
provide some support for the submission that any misdirection did not render the conviction unsafe. If, as the
respondents submit, the appellant was fortunate to get the direction that he did then it must also follow that the
conviction is not unsafe.
(d) Analysis and Conclusions
167. Again, for the reasons that we have already given, we do not consider that this appellant was entitled to a full
good character direction, whether by reference to s.101 or at all. The judge concluded that the appellant was entitled to
a modified good character direction and that is what she provided. As to propensity, the judge highlighted the fact that
the appellant had no convictions of a sexual nature and those convictions that he did have were "quite different" from
anything of a sexual nature. She went on to add that the fact that he did not have any similar criminal convictions "may
make it less likely that he acted as is now alleged against him". She also stressed that none of those previous offences
related to dishonesty. Accordingly, we do not consider that any criticism can be made of the propensity direction.
168. As to credibility, as we have already said, the direction stressed that the appellant had not been convicted of any
offences of dishonesty and that "the convictions could not assist you with whether he has told the truth on this occasion
and so do not be tempted to use them against him for that purpose". Given that, for the reasons that we have previously
given, this appellant was not entitled to a positive credibility direction because of his previous convictions, we consider
that the modified good character direction that he was given was eminently fair and reasonable. Indeed, we agree with
the respondent that, in some ways, the appellant was fortunate to receive the direction in the terms that he did.
169. Saruwu's appeal against conviction is therefore dismissed.
LONSDALE
(a) Facts
170. The complainant C was born in 1986. For a number of years she lived with the appellant, who is now aged 48.
In about 2010, approximately a year before she complained to the police, C watched a television programme about child
abuse with her boyfriend, and told him that something similar had happened to her. He encouraged C to tell her mother.
171. On 11 January 2011 C told her mother that the appellant had once asked her to have sex with him. Her mother