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about the chair’s dangerous condition; its use because Bonner was directed or allowed to use the chair during his
medical treatment. Contrary to the court of appeals’ analysis, Bonner does not assert that the County’s act of stor-
ing the chair was a breach of any duty of care. But it would not matter even if Bonner raised that allegation. As
the Attorney General points out, a claim based on the storage of the damaged chair in the multipurpose room four
days before Bonner’s accident is not a claim for which governmental immunity is waived under the Tort Claims
Act, which “is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common-law recovery against the government.”
…
The statutes, however, only immunize the County from liability to the extent its corporate actions or omissions were
not performed with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others. The County’s summary-
judgment motion was accordingly based on immunity from liability, not immunity from suit. The distinction is
significant because immunity from suit implicates jurisdictional concerns whereas immunity from liability is an
affirmative defense that must be pled and proven.
…
We, however, agree with the trial court that the statutes apply here to bar the County’s liability. We further agree
with the trial court’s summary judgment which determined that there was no evidence or fact issue regarding the
County’s conscious indifference and thus no basis to negate the statutory immunity. We accordingly reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Bonner take nothing.
th
Tarrant Co. v. Bonner, Tex. Sup. Court., No. 18-0431, May 24 , 2019.
7. WARRANTS AND AFFIDAVITS
WARRANT – LEGIBILITY OF MAGISTRATE SIGNATURE.
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.04(5) requires, in part, that a search warrant contain a legible magistrate’s
signature. So what effect does an illegible magistrate’s signature have upon the applicability of the statutory good-
faith exception? See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b) (setting forth statutory good-faith exception). The
short answer is none. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court
for further proceedings.
After Appellee Cesar Ramiro Arellano was arrested for driving while intoxicated, the arresting officer, Phillip
Garcia, prepared a probable cause affidavit to support a search warrant for a blood draw. Officer Garcia submit-
ted his sworn affidavit to the on-duty magistrate. Using a cursive signature, the magistrate signed the blank sig-
nature line of a form search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of Appellee’s blood. Below the signature
line appeared the words, “Magistrate, Victoria County, Texas.” Aside from the cursive signature, the magistrate’s
name was not typed or handwritten anywhere on the warrant. [emphasis by ed. Could the entire issue and this
appeal have been avoided had this been done? Probably!] Upon execution of the search warrant, Appellee was
charged with DWI.
In the trial court, Appellee filed a motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the blood draw. At the pretrial
suppression hearing, Appellee argued that the search warrant to obtain the blood specimen was facially invalid be-
cause the magistrate’s signature was illegible in violation of the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Ar-
ticle 18.04(5). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.04(5) (providing that a search warrant “shall be sufficient”
if it contains, among other “requisites,” “the magistrate’s name [ ] in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten
form with the magistrate’s signature”). Therefore, he contended, the evidence was subject to suppression under
A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 108 2021 Edition