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probable cause rule, as the Gov ernment need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect
explained below. App. 34. Consequently, an individuals who are threatened with imminent
order issued under Section 2703(d) of the Act harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of
is not a permissible mechanism for accessing evidence.
historical cell-site records. Before compelling a
wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, As a result, if law enforcement is
the Government’s obligation is a familiar one— confronted with an urgent situation, such fact-
get a warrant. specific threats will likely justify the
warrantless collection of CSLI. Lower courts,
ALITO contends that the warrant for instance, have approved warrantless
requirement simply does not apply when the searches related to bomb threats, active
Government acquires records using shootings, and child abductions. Our decision
compulsory process. Unlike an actual search, today does not call into doubt warrantless
he says, subpoenas for documents do not access to CSLI in such circumstances. While
involve the direct taking of evidence; they are police must get a warrant when collecting
at most a “construc tive search” conducted by CSLI to assist in the mine-run criminal
the target of the subpoena. But this Court has investigation, the rule we set forth does not
never held that the Government may subpoena limit their ability to respond to an ongoing
third parties for records in which the suspect emergency.
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. At
some point, the dissent should recognize that As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous
CSLI is an entirely different species of business dissent, the Court is obligated—as “[s]ubtler
record—something that implicates basic and more far-reaching means of invading
Fourth Amendment concerns about arbi trary privacy have become available to the
government power much more directly than Government”—to ensure that the “progress of
corpo rate tax or payroll ledgers. When science” does not erode Fourth Amendment
confronting new con cerns wrought by digital protections. Here the progress of science has
technology, this Court has been careful not to afforded law enforcement a power ful new tool
uncritically extend existing precedents. If the to carry out its important responsibilities. At the
choice to proceed by subpoena provided a same time, this tool risks Government
categori cal limitation on Fourth Amendment encroachment of the sort the Framers, “after
protection, no type of record would ever be consulting the lessons of history,” drafted the
protected by the warrant require ment. Fourth Amendment to prevent.
Further, even though the Government will We decline to grant the state unrestricted
generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case- access to a wireless carrier’s database of
specific exceptions may support a warrantless physical location infor mation. In light of the
search of an individual’s cell-site records under deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth,
certain circumstances. “One well-recognized breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the
exception applies when ‘“the exigencies of the inescapable and automatic nature of its
situation” make the needs of law enforcement collection, the fact that such information is
so compel ling that [a] warrantless search is gathered by a third party does not make it any
objectively reasonable under the Fourth less deserving of Fourth Amendment protec -
Amendment.’” Such exigencies include the tion. The Government’s acquisition of the cell-
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