Page 124 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The French Diplomats 111

sion to expand its military machine any further. But he did not believe that
other powers—he mentioned France, Poland, and russia—would accept
his “sensible” proposal, and he therefore would demand that Germany be
permitted to increase the size of its army to three hundred thousand men,
two hundred thousand more than permitted by the treaty of Versailles. He
would be prepared, he said, to sign a convention outlawing chemical and
bacteriological warfare as well as the bombardment of civilian areas in the
event of war. Finally, Hitler promised that he would reenter a reorganized
league of Nations, one that resolved international conflicts rather than ex-
acerbated them.
two weeks later, at the second meeting with Hitler that fall, François-
Poncet announced that France had “reservations” about the Führer’s pro-
posal for disarmament. the French cabinet had concluded that in view of
the many statements by Hitler on the subject and his decisions since com-
ing to power, that was no longer an option. the major sticking points were
his insistence that Germany be permitted to maintain the sa and to enlarge
the army to three hundred thousand men. the Nazis claimed, as they had
in conversations with British envoys, that the sa was a purely political or-
ganization, which was patently not the case. and after 1933, the sa increas-
ingly took on the character of a full-scale military force: it was divided into
sections, companies, battalions, and regiments, and it also commanded its
own motorized units. all the members received extensive military training.
as already noted, by the end of 1933 the sa had grown into a formidable
force. Understandably, the French and British governments insisted that
the sa, which the German authorities on december 1 declared to be an
“official” institution, constituted a significant reserve that could quickly be
mobilized. Hitler also let it be known that he would not disband the ss.
the two Western governments regarded these two military organizations as
a critical bone of contention that stymied every attempt to reach an agree-
ment with Germany during the first years of Nazi rule.
in a second dispatch on the interview of december 9, François-Pon-
cet provided interesting additional information: he now reported that the
Führer had behaved differently from the way he had conducted himself
at his previous meetings; this time he was “surly” and “disagreeable” and
appeared to be generally “displeased and anxious.” He claimed to be “as-
tonished” that France would not give up its views on disarmament. He in-
sisted that only if the major powers changed their position would Germany
modify its stance, and he reiterated that he did not intend to dissolve the

On the British view of the sa and ss, see pp. 32, 42, 60–61 above.