Page 174 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The American Diplomats 161

dodd, “we are of course prepared to support you in any decision you may
make.” By this time dodd had concluded that acceptance of the invitation
would be a “vicious precedent” that the Nazis could “exploit intensively.”
it would constitute an endorsement of the “present regime” and would
thus weaken the domestic opposition to Nazism. the British ambassador
initially favored acceptance of the invitation, but changed his mind and sent
the Nazi authorities a note informing them that “urgent family reasons”
prevented his attendance. the French and spanish officials also found some
excuse to skip the Nuremberg events, and dodd followed his original in-
stincts; he turned down the invitation on the ground, as he put it in his
note to the Nazi organizers, “that i could not absent myself from Berlin
long enough to have the pleasure of accepting.” it was a minor rebuke and
a minor setback for the Nazis. 41
dodd’s revulsion at domestic developments in Germany was not simply
a reflection of his democratic and liberal outlook. He also came to under-
stand, as early as 1933, that there was a close connection between Hitler’s for-
eign and domestic policies, and that the former would soon pose a danger
to international peace. dodd developed this theme in a series of dispatches
in November 1933 in which he discussed at some length the referendum the
government had prepared on the following question: “do you, German
man, and you, German woman, approve the policy of your Government
and are you ready to recognize it as the expression of your own view and
your own will and solemnly pledge yourself to it?” Citizens were to vote
in circles marked “yes” and “no.” the main purpose of this referendum, as
dodd noted, was to secure public approval for Germany’s withdrawal from
the league of Nations and from the disarmament Conference in Geneva,
two steps that created a measure of anxiety among the people fearful of an-
other war. the Nazi authorities staged a massive campaign that included
widespread intimidation of citizens to secure overwhelming approval of the
question. Only a “hopeless minority” would have the courage to vote no. in
fact, the Nazis succeeded in mobilizing support for their policies, perhaps
far beyond their expectations: 96.3 percent of the voters cast their ballots in
the affirmative, and in the election for the reichstag that took place at the
same time, 95.2 percent voted for the Nazi ticket. the Nazis had left nothing
to chance. even inmates at concentration camps supported the government:
at dachau, 2,231 prisoners voted in the affirmative; only 9 submitted invalid
ballots, and only 3 voted no. at another camp, in Frankfurt, 67 out of 99
political prisoners allowed to vote gave their approval to Hitler’s program.
although it was obvious that the election had been rigged and that many