Page 87 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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74  The British Diplomats

              Henderson  was  convinced—on  March  5,  1938,  eight  days  before  Hitler
              marched into austria—that the Führer was not thinking of “Anschluss or
              of annexation” because that would “merely add to his present difficulties
              rather than simplify them.” 143
                the avoidance of war was uppermost in shaping Henderson’s views on
              Nazism, but in articulating them the ambassador revealed sympathy for the
              racist views of Hitler’s movement. On January 26, 1938, he wrote eden that
              a war between Germany and Britain “would . . . be absolutely disastrous—i
              could not imagine and would be unwilling to survive the defeat of the Brit-
              ish empire. at the same time, i would view with dismay another defeat of
              Germany, which would merely serve the purpose of inferior races.” 144
                it is hard to explain why Henderson sent such mixed messages to lon-
              don. He may have feared that an unqualified defense of Hitler would raise
              eyebrows at the Foreign Office, where Chamberlain’s appeasement policy
              was viewed with much skepticism. as it was, many in the government sus-
              pected him of being sympathetic to Nazism. Or perhaps he occupied a post
              for which he was simply unqualified, which might explain behavior that
              was notably inconsistent or perhaps simply irrational.
                as ambassador to Berlin, Henderson was, of course, the key arbiter of
              the contents of the dispatches to london, and he was careful to put his
              stamp on the information that left his office. in addition, he exerted con-
              siderable influence at the highest circles of the British government, much
              more than most envoys. When he was in london, he often attended cabi-
              net meetings devoted to foreign policy matters, and senior officials paid
              careful attention to his advice.
                But it turned out that his influence at the embassy did not match either
              his expectations or his hopes. When he was away from his Berlin office, the
              staff at times sent messages to london that represented its views, not those
              of the ambassador. in 1938, Henderson was diagnosed with cancer, and
              from October until February 1939 he stayed in london for treatment. dur-
              ing that long absence, the embassy was run by sir George Ogilvie-Forbes,
              a forty-seven-year-old descendant of an upper-class scottish family. Ogilvie
              was highly gifted and quickly acquired a reputation as an excellent diplo-
              mat. a protégé of Vansittart, Ogilvie held views of Germany and Nazism
              that differed sharply from Henderson’s. Henderson had done his best to
              ignore him, but during the ambassador’s long absence, Ogilvie came into
              his own. 145  the tone and substance of the dispatches sent to the Foreign
              Office changed dramatically.
                Ogilvie  was  not  a  hothead  and  certainly  did  not  favor  a  rush  to  war
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