Page 104 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency
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Orchestrating different forms of knowledge  93

            Harnik among others to choose the best version out of a wealth of musical
            material that had been generated by a computer algorithm. Harnik remarked
            that this evaluation was difficult. “With ‘manual work’”, she said, evaluation
            and choice were already integrated into the process of generating material:
            “First, because I reach my intuitive decisions much more quickly, since the
            choice is reduced, and also because I put the material directly into the context
            of composing. For me, the computer results created a sort of ‘isolated’ material.”
            Indeed, a music computer simply operates on the basis of a syntax. By contrast,
            composers also use cultural semantics that constitute their understanding of
            musical material. They view the sound material (e.g. a sequence of notes, a
            sound structure) holistically, which means they view it both from an internal
            musical perspective (what is written down before, what follows after?) and
            from a cultural perspective that generates imageries, meaningful relations and
            tentative associations. In other words, subtly differentiated perceptions by
            experts usually result in the ability to make very case-specific judgements and
            take case-tailored action. In the daily work routine, such subtle perceptions and
            discriminations unfold during the flow of actions and make non-intentional,
            implicit learning possible. As Polanyi (1958: 50) summarises: “Rules of art
            can be useful, but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are
            maxims, which can serve as a guide to an art only if they can be integrated
            into the practical knowledge of the art. They cannot replace this knowledge.”


            3.2 The centrality of learning
            Many psychologists emphasise the importance of being gifted and talented,
            characteristics which are usually mentioned in the subject literature alongside
            the physiological requirements for top-level sports (see Chambliss 1989) and
            for the arts (see Weisberg 2006: 769f.). Both concepts are legitimate, but they
            should not be understood to mean that an individual’s innate disposition or
            “inner quality” can shift the central importance of learning. Gifts and talents –
            the two concepts that now replace the older terminology of “genius”– are still
            being used today by conservatoires to legitimise their procedures for selecting
            students. The concepts are also a widely accepted explanation of artistic success.
            However, their meaning, which is both simplifying and opaque, masks the
            social and competitive nature of artistic professions and thus makes artistic
            success seem “natural” (for a more elaborate analysis, see Tschmuck 2010:
            ch.10; Menger 2014: ch. 4). In other words, the concepts have an ideological
            impact in that they consolidate a presocial, and sometimes an other-worldly,
            conception of artistic practice.
              The discussion of processes of learning and skill acquisition opens up a
            completely different perspective onto artistic abilities. Learning enables people
            to take up and transform practices and thus reproduce and refine a tradition.
            Etienne Wenger (2002: 96) puts the central importance of processes of learning
            thus: “Learning is the engine of practice and practice is the history of that
            learning. […] To assert that learning is what gives rise to communities of
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