Page 12 - AAPT March 2019

Feature Story

‘It is ironic that the air power story in Afghanistan, both for the brief 2001 campaign
and as a pervasive enabler of the mission creeping since then, has been as first-rate as
ultimately it was futile.’
Colin S. Gray, Air Power for Strategic Effect, p. 252.

In many ways, air power is viewed as power, which had by now been fine- casualties, especially during the
one of the fundamental, and at times tuned into a precision instrument, less application of lethal force from the air.
critical, elements of Western military effective against emerging threats. This casualty-aversion tends to dilute
power. Its presence is tangibly visible In the discussions to delineate the the effectiveness of air power, which in
even when not being employed to apply role of the military forces in irregular turn becomes a limiting factor.
lethal force and its technology enabled wars, what has not been appreciated The limitation is particularly
capabilities seem untouchable in its fully is that air power is the only element noticeable when air power is
sophistication. that can establish the necessary functioning as the
Air power is also seen as a strategic superiority to achieve command of pr inc iple
advantage of the mature military forces the air to ensure that surface forces
and therefore an irregular adversary could operate freely and without
always attempts to neutralise this source interference anywhere
of capability advantage. This quest in the world.
has led to the adoption of asymmetric
means by irregular forces globally.
It is ironic that perhaps the best
illustration of the employment of
asymmetric means was through
a novel employment of air power
against arguably the world leader
in air power, when the World Trade
Center twin towers were destroyed in Stand-off air power
September 2001. capabilities are able to dominate both
It was in the 1990s that air power air-land and air sea engagements. support for ground
emerged as the supported rather However, there are two caveats to forces in that are contact with,
than the supporting element in the this sweeping statement that puts it and pursuing an ephemeral adversary.
application of military force in the in context. The first caveat emanates In these circumstances, the strategic
pursuit of national objectives. However, from the trend in surface combat to value of obtaining absolute control
this perceived predominance was move into complex terrain where of the air is also diminished, even
short-lived since the war on terror tactically dispersed irregular forces when countering irregular forces with
in the 2000s reduced the relative prefer to operate because they become absolutely no air power capabilities.
importance and significance of air elusive targets. Irregular wars act as a limiting factor
power, at least outwardly. With the When man-portable air defence in the effectiveness of air power—
advent of the US-led Global War on systems are added to the mix and from benign to the lethal application
Terror (a term that has since fallen the lower altitudes become contested of force.
into disuse) the prevalent belief was air space, the assurance of absolute In the European theatre of operations
that the global security environment control of the air will not be universal. in the 1990s the application of air
had been transformed. Further, it was The second caveat stems from power in the pursuit of national and
felt that this transformation made air the prevailing focus on limiting own coalition objectives was a resounding

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