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Feature Story

       AIR POWER AND EFFECTS-BASED


       OPERATIONS:


       THE NEED FOR DEEPER ANALYSIS



       Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a   sustained development of theories and   conventional view of air power as being
       term and a concept that is difficult to   concepts.                      predominantly  a  support  element  for
       define precisely, with a large number   The contemporary trend to box air   surface  operations. This,  somewhat
       of definitions available in the literature   power, its concepts and application into   unforeseen  development,  clearly
       on the subject.                      a contextual war against irregular forces,   demonstrated the less than optimum
          Perhaps the one that comes closest   when viewed against the broad spectrum   understanding and lack of analysis of air
       to being definitive is the one provided   of conflict scenario, is incorrect. In order   power capabilities and their technology-
       by the US Joint Forces Command that   to realise its full potential and from a   enabled exponential growth. The same
       states, ‘[EBO is] a process for obtaining   developmental point of view, air power   lack  of  incisive  analysis  was  visible
       a desired strategic outcome or effect on   must be conceptualised in the context of   when air power absorbed Colonel John
       the enemy through the synergistic and   conventional wars. This is so because   Warden’s  appreciation  of  the  enemy
       cumulative application of the full range   success in conventional wars requires   as a system of systems and adopted
       of military and non-military capabilities   the employment of the full spectrum of   EBO as the prevalent concept for the
       at all levels of conflict.’          air  power  capabilities,  before  during   application of air power.
          Over the past three decades or so,   and after the conflict. In turn, only the   Why  has  it  become  increasingly
       the development of air power concepts   availability of full-spectrum capabilities   important  to  analyse  new  concepts
       of  operations  has  been  almost  fully   would permit the contextual tailoring of   before  employing  them? Air  power
       based  on  the  need  to  create  the   air power application necessary to cater   today is an instrument of national power
       necessary effects that would support the   for emerging circumstances.   that  can  be  applied  with  precision,
       joint EBO. Success in this endeavour   Air  power  thinking  and  concept   proportionality  and  discrimination  to
       has  been  somewhat  diffused,  less   development must remain broad-based   create  the  desired  effect  across  a
       than optimum and not always assured.   in order to retain the flexibility necessary   broad  spectrum  of  activities—from
       This  situation  indicates  that  a  more   to overcome operational and tactical   delivering humanitarian aid to fighting
       in-depth  analysis  of  the  factors  that   challenges  and  peculiar  battlefield   a war of national survival. This spread
       influence the application of air power   issues.  Overcoming  operational  and   and  depth  of  air  power  capabilities
       must  be  undertaken  to  ensure  the   tactical  challenges  is  critical  to  the   make  it  imperative  to  analyse  the
       correct trajectory for the development   success  of  air  power  application  but   applicability  of  concepts  before  they
       of concepts of operations.           they only form a small although crucial   are  employed. The  reason  could  be
          The  strategic  development  of  air   input into the capability development   that  air  forces  as  institutions  did  not
       power  has  long  suffered  from  the   process. The major influence will have   possess the intellectual depth required
       disadvantage of a lack of inclination and   to be a broad assessment of national   to cultivate a culture based on inquisitive
       motivation to carry out detailed analysis   security needs to ensure an extended   analysis  at  the  conceptual  level.
       of its own progression and evolutionary   horizon for capability development.  Problem solving efforts were focused
       needs. Sufficient intellectual capital has   Air Power developmental thinking   on  tactical  challenges—as  action-
       not been invested in understanding and   in the early days was dominated by the   oriented  people  almost  always  do.
       then creating the path for air power to   ‘strategic school’ of thought that tried   Pragmatic questioning of the veracity of
       evolve as an effective envelope force   to position air power as the element   a concept that had been proven once in
       capable  of  creating  the  necessary   that  would  win  wars  rapidly  and  at   employment was a bridge too far. EBO
       effects to achieve the desired political   lesser cost in treasure and lives. This   remains in this basket.
       end-state.  For  the  first  century  of  its   concept  was  a  direct  result  of  the   The celebrated success of air power
       existence as a military force element, air   traumatic carnage experienced in the   in Operation Desert Storm returned the
       power has laboured within this restricted   trenches of World War I. In a somewhat   strategic school to centre stage, making
       environment, where intellectual capacity   lackadaisical  manner,  the  use  of  the   air power enthusiasts reiterate the claim
       for  future  development  has  always   atom bomb at the end of World    of  air  power  being  an  independent
       been constrained. The main reason for   War  II  was  viewed  as  validating   war-winning  force.  This  claim  was
       this malaise perhaps lies in the nature   the  concept  of  strategic  bombing  to   further reinforced by the demonstration
       of air power that attracts people with   ‘win  wars’.  Thereafter,  a  series  of   of  air  power’s  success  in  the  limited
       a  proclivity  for  action  more  than  for   concepts— such as the air-land battle   engagements in Europe in the 1990s,
       intellectual investigation that leads to   that  were  developed—reinforced  the   mostly against non-airpowerssessing

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