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of this slogan means indescribable atrocities occurring to- day in Kosovo. its future result is the drama that will in- eluctably follow the Serbian backlashes. What is not so apparent are the anti-Serbian political and ethnic forces which have promoted the de-Serbianization in the federal units outside the republic of Serbia which have also result- ed in the constant and silent tide of Serbs migrating from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to “Serbia Proper.”
The aimless, empty character of contemporary Yugo- slav policy toward Kosovo is symptomatic of the atmo- sphere which has answered atrocities with benign neglect. There exists not even a plan how to peacefully return the ethnic situation in Kosovo to the status quo ante alba- nian incursion. also symptomatic is the reaction of many non-Serbs to the requests of the new Serbian leadership for Serbian equality with other federal republics—these requests are compromised by using the old-fashioned Stalinistic cliché of “new Serbian hegemony.”
in the writings of many americans about the Kosovo tragedy, as well as in the statements of many american officials, the Serbian people find support and a belief that the end of anti-Serbian manipulation is at hand, and that the Serbs will finally receive help from the Western de- mocracies. in a recent pronouncement by Gorbachev in Belgrade, regarding the “genetic relation of Serbs and Rus- sians” the Serbs have also heard another voice acclaim- ing the end of Stalinist anti-Serbianism. Yugoslavs recog- nize that artificial protection of certain groups to the det- riment of others has been carried to an absurd extreme. They are aware that a new process of true democratic de- velopment must occur in Yugoslavia: democratic devel- opment that will triumph over the Comintern anti-Ser- bianism and once again revive and strengthen the Yugo- slav idea. any other course, honorable ladies and gentle- men, would lead to a quite predictable disaster.
Closed Hearing on Serb-Albanian Relations in Yugoslavia Before the U S House of Representatives Foreign Affairs, edited by Momčilo Selić; american Serbian Heritage Foundation: 1988. This is an edited transcript of the papers read on april 27, 1988, before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights, in a Closed Hearing in Room H129 of the Capitol Building, Wash- ington, D.C.
The War:
The Serbs Had Little Choice
RonaldL Hatchett
The primary justification for our military strikes against Yugoslavia is its refusal to sign the Kosovo peace agreement put forward by the United States and its allies at Rambouil- let, France. The president told us that the albanians chose peace by signing the agreement even though “they did not get everything they wanted.” The Serbs, he said, refused to negotiate, even though the agreement left Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia. However, as in several other instances over the past months, the president is telling us only part of the story. Most americans assume that the deal we put to- gether at Rambouillet was evenhanded, offering advantage to neither side, but including the core concerns of both al- banians and Serbs alike. But few of us have taken the time to look at the actual agreement the president is condemn- ing the Serbs for not signing. i urge you to do so.
Under the agreement, “Kosovo will have a president, prime minister and government, an assembly, its own Su- preme Court, constitutional court and other courts and prosecutors.”
“Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not sub- ject to revision by Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugo- slavia, including levying taxes, instituting programs of eco- nomic, scientific, technological, regional and social devel- opment, conducting foreign relations within its area of re- sponsibility in the same manner as a Republic.”
“Yugoslav army forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo, except for a limited border guard force (active only within a 5 kilometers border zone).”
“Serb security forces “police” will withdraw completely from Kosovo except for a limited number of border police (active only within a 5 km border zone).”
The parties invite NaTO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized to use necessary force to ensure compliance with the accords.”
“The international community will play a role in ensur- ing that these provisions are carried out through a Civilian implementation Mission “appointed by NaTO.”
“The Chief of the CiM has the authority to issue bind- ing directives to the Parties on all important matters he sees fit, including appointing and removing officials and curtailing institutions.”
“Three years after the implementation of the accords, an international meeting will be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people.”
The Rambouillet accord would have turned Kosovo into a NaTO colony in every respect, but it also would have gone a long way toward subordinating all of Yugosla- via. it revived the hated colonial concept of “extraterritori-
a Chronicle of the Contemporary Suffering of Kosovo-Metohian Serbs
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