Page 832 - Kosovo Metohija Heritage
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ality,” under which the colonizers were immune from be- ing tried by the courts of the colonized country, even if they committed—as they often did—rape or murder. But most remarkably of all,
“NaTO personnel shall enjoy, together with their ve- hicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestrict- ed passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY in- cluding associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneu- ver, billet and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.”
“NaTO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charg- es occasioned by mere use.”
“The Parties (i.e. Yugoslavia and “Kosovo”) shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, in- cluding broadcast services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NaTO. This shall include the right to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate and the right to use all of the electromag- netic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost.”
years, these arrangements would be made permanent by the “will of the people”—not the people of the whole coun- try of Yugoslavia of which Kosovo is supposedly a part, but only by the will of the people of Kosovo, who are mainly albanians.
The Rambouillet accord was, in truth, a declaration of war disguised as a peace agreement. The Yugoslavian del- egation at Rambouillet agreed to give the albanians au- tonomy in Kosovo—control over their day-to-day lives in- cluding religious, education and health care systems, and local government operations. But they tried to negotiate changes to preserve the right of the Yugoslav federal gov- ernment to determine economic and foreign policy, for Yugoslav national law to continue to apply in Kosovo, and for any international presence in Kosovo to be limited to observation and advice, not control. The Serbian negotiat- ing efforts were summarily dismissed and the Serbs were told they had only two choices: sign the agreement as writ- ten or face NaTO bombing.
What would you have done if you were on the Serb del- egation?
“NaTO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need
to make improvements or modifications to certain infra-
structure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, build-
ings,andutilitysystems.” ...
“NaTO shall be immune from all legal process, wheth- er civil, administrative, or criminal.” “NaTO personnel, un- der all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties, jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administra- tive, criminal or disciplinary offenses which may be com- mitted by them in the FRY.” “NaTO personnel shall be im- mune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY.”The arrival of NaTO troops in Kosovo would, by itself, be a gross violation of Yugosla- via’s and Serbia’s sovereignty. But the proposed accord re- quires that Yugoslavia allow NaTO unfettered access to any and all parts of the country’s territory, with all costs to be borne by the host country! This blatantly violates Yugo- slavia’s sovereignty in so provocative a manner that it can- not have been accidental. as another commentator has noted, “it is not difficult to imagine a working group in the State Department charged with the task of thinking up the most intrusive and insulting clauses possible to insert into the agreement. Clearly, U.S. policymakers never intended for Yugoslavia’s leadership to sign this document.” For the Kosovo albanians, the Rambouillet agreement gives them total control over the province immediately. The only sac- rifice required of them is to wait three years before the ar- rangements are made legally permanent. For the Serbs, the Rambouillet agreement means that immediately upon sign- ing they lose all sovereignty over Kosovo. Total political control would be in the hands of the albanians and the NaTO Civilian implementation Mission. Yugoslav laws would no longer apply in Kosovo. Neither would Yugosla- via be able to exercise police powers in Kosovo. after three
February 17, 2002
Gračanica—His Grace artemije, the Bishop of Raška- Prizren, served the memorial service for the Serbs killed in the terrorist attack of the Kosovo albanians on the convoy of Serbian buses at a place Livadice near Podujevo. Bishop artemije served together with the clergymen of the Dio- cese of Raška-Prizren in the churchyard of the Gračanica Monastery on Saturday, February 16.
“Had the committers of this terrorist attack been found and brought to justice, that would have surely been a great comfort to the Serbs in Kosovo”—said Bishop artemije in his speech after the memorial service, and added that he “expects the day would come when the Serbs would be able to breathe freely, to move and live on their ancient hearths.”
Besides several thousands citizens, there were also Mr Nebojša Čović, Vice-President of the Serbian Government and the leader of the Coordination Center for Kosovo/Me- tohija established by he Federal and Republic Governments; members of Parliament of Kosovo/Metohija—representa- tives of the Serbian coalition “Return;” and Mr Momčilo Trajković, President of the Serbian Movement of Resis- tance.
after the memorial service, the gathered citizens start- ed walking from the Monastery to the center of Gračanica, thus showing protest since the international community has not provided security to the Serbs in Kosovo/Metohija up to now.
an abbreviated version of this article was originally published in The Houston Chronicle, on March 28, 1999.

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