Page 89 - Fighting Against the Injustice of the State and Globalization

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Fighting Against the Injustice of the State and Globalization
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papers,such as Oromia and Gucaa Dargagoo, that agitated for the Oromo national move-
ment. The Oromo armed struggle that resumed in Gara Mulata, Hararghe, in 1976
faced major problems because of the lack of sanctuary and the confrontation between
Somalia and Ethiopia over eastern Oromia. Just as Ethiopia wanted to assimilate and
destroy Oromo peoplehood and to claim Oromo resources as Ethiopian, Somalia
attempted to Somalize Oromos and claim Oromo resources as Somali within the vi-
sion of a greater Somalia.According to Ernest Gellner, the Somali viewed “the Oromo
as a kind of human population without a set of form, a pre-ethnic raw material, wait-
ing to be turned either into Amharas or into Somalis by the turn of political fortune
187
and religious conversion.”
The Somali government applied the term “Somali Abbo” to Oromo refugees in
Somalia, claiming that Oromos in Bale, Arssi, Sidamo, and Hararghe were “Somali
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Abbo” who did not know their identity and called themselves mistakenly Oromos.
From the beginning, the OLF faced strong opposition from both the Ethiopian colo-
nialists and the Somali expansionists. As a result, the development of the OLF was
slowed because it lost some leaders, fighters, supporters, and sympathizers.The Somali
government created the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) in 1976 to serve as a
branch of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) for incorporating eastern and
southern Oromia. Some Somali elites have remained the enemy of Oromo national-
ism. Comparing the opposition of Somali and Amhara elites to Oromo nationalism,
Hassen states, “Whereas the Amhara elites saw the danger to their empire in the
growth of Oromo nationalism, the Somali elites perceived the frustration of their am-
bition in the birth of Oromo nationalism.The Amhara attitude was nourished by the
spectre of the disintegration of their empire for, without the resources of Oromia,
Ethiopia cannot exist as a viable state. The attitude of the Somali ruling elites was
nourished by the untenable ambition to build greater Somalia.” 189 Despite the brutal-
ity of both the Ethiopian and Somali governments against the OLF, it survived and
extended its influence.
In 1981, the OLF launched an operation in Wallaga,Western Oromia. It built its
military sources through a series of surprise attacks on the Ethiopian forces and the
capture of their weapons and other materials. 190 During the Ethio-Somali war of
1977–1978,OLF fighters captured some weapons and ammunition from both sides. 191
Since the OLF did not have international assistance, it depended on the local popula-
tion for food, intelligence, and supplies. 192 Due to lack of international support and
sanctuary, Ethiopian brutality, Somali opposition to Oromo nationalism, and internal
disagreement within Oromo elites, the growth of Oromo nationalism was very slow
in the 1970s and the 1980s. However, as the Ethiopian military regime of the Derg in-
tensified its political pacification through its villagization schemes, its economic con-
centration through the expropriation of Oromo properties, and its de-Oromization of
Oromia through settling Amharas and Tigrayans there, thousands of Oromos began to
recognize the importance of armed struggle. As the OLF intensified its agitation
through its radio station, the Voice of Oromo Liberation, and various political net-
works, its areas of influence expanded.Then, to frustrate and weaken an Oromo urban
connection, the military regime imprisoned or murdered prominent Oromo intellec-
tuals, students, and merchants in the 1980s. Baxter notes why successive Ethiopian
governments have been seriously concerned about Oromo nationalism, and says,“The
crucial dependence of Ethiopia on the Oromo inclines the central . . . government to
strike out at any manifestation of Oromo consciousness.” 193