Page 18 - CHIRP annual digest 2016.pdf

CHIRP Maritime

What did the reporter tell us? igniting within the multiple paint layers. Several of the
During welding operations, a fire broke out on the outside layers were presumably not recently applied, but all or
of a ship’s superstructure. Within two minutes the entire some must have retained combustible products.
after side of the superstructure was on fire. Contributing
Paints are complex substances comprising many con -
factors are reported to have been the dozen layers of paint
found to have been applied, with flammable components stituent parts; many of these can provide fuel to a fire,
in particular solvents. These may not leave underlying
between the paint layers arising from allowance of inade -
quate time between the paint applications. The weld ing was applications of paint if ‘over-coating’ is done too quickly,
or if faster curing coats are applied on top of slower
conducted on the outside of the superstructure on a deck
panel. Sparks dropped into a pile of rubbish that ignited; the curing ones. Incorrect coat thicknesses, or environmental
factors such as excess temperature at the time of
fire quickly spread. There was no fire watch set by either
ship’s staff or the repair yard. An attempt to extinguish the application, may also trap solvents. Product data sheets,
application instructions and/or makers’ advice are
fire with a ‘high pressure cleaner’ did not work; the fire was
later successfully put out. essential to the understanding of risks; in the absence of
these or in the case of incomplete historic data, good
Lessons to be learnt safety management practice is the appro priate course
This is a salutary report, reminding us of many safety (including awareness of the generic risks). The key point
principles applicable during hot work. is that paint in proximity to hot work should always be
treated as presenting a high risk of fire. A clean area of
The UK MCA’s Code of Safe Working Practices for
work, clearance of rubbish, and paint removal in way of
Merchant Seafarers (2015 edition) (“UKCOSWP 2015”) hotwork could have prevented this incident.
attends to this in chapter 24. Some key messages
relevant to this particular case are contained in the text CHIRP Suggests
box below. Take hot work seriously. It should never happen without
the ship’s (and, if appropriate, the yard’s) leadership and
Some key messages (UKCOSWP 2015) relevant to this management knowing about and owning the activity and
case: hot work.
associated precautions. Never treat it as routine. Follow a
■ Hot work should be subject to a ‘permit to work’. comprehensive check-off list every time, based on the
■ Training should have been completed and in date.
UKCOSWP 2015 or equivalent guidance. Authorise and
■ Comprehensive precautions against fire and explo - supervise the work properly, know what is flammable,
sion should be taken. “No combustible solids,
remember adjacent compartments, remove everything
liquids or gases (should be) adjacent”. flammable before work, be alert to the properties of paints
■ Supervision and observation should be in place.
in the vicinity, and ensure repeated follow-up checks.
■ Suitable fire extinguishers should be to hand. The above article was published in MFB44
■ All adjacent compartments should be visited on
completion.
■ Frequent checks should be made for at least 2
Article. 14
hours after completion of hot work.
Correspondence: Fire Down Below
NOTE: ALWAYS REFER TO THE FULL TEXT – UKCOSWP
Further to the latest report in Maritime FEEDBACK 44, a
2015, CH 24.
reporter has shared with us an investigation into an incident
We don’t have details of training levels, supervision, or several years ago, in which a spark from burning equipment
the ‘permit to work’ (PTW) arrangements in place. landed on pipework lagging and the paint on top of that
However it is clear that precautions against the out - lagging caught fire. The lagging had been stripped to an
break of fire were inadequate. There was a failure to extent but had not been stripped com pletely. The build-up
clear the area of potential fire risks, no fire watch and of paint on the deckhead cover ing the insulation is believed
no fire extinguishers to hand, which infers a hotwork’ to be the main accelerant to the fire spreading across the
PTW had not been completed, nor adequate supervision space. This was subsequently confirmed in a separate test
provided. that created a similar situation.

Of particular interest is the speed and spread of the fire, At the time of the incident, the individuals concerned were
apparently caused by trapped flammable products carrying out deck penetrations from the deck above down

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