Page 37 - CHIRP annual digest 2016.pdf

CHIRPAnnual Digest 2016

avoidance aid, the provisions of the COLREGs should At 0027LT, the ship that was anchored right astern, called
remain uppermost (see the next article); and (2) there own vessel on VHF radio, which was not answered.
is no provision in the COLREGS for the use of AIS Subsequently there were calls from a 3rd ship to another
information; decisions should therefore be based pri - vessel and a blowing of the whistle. When the Master heard
marily on visual and/or radar information. the whistle he realised that his ship was dragging its anchor.
By this time own vessel had a sternway of 1 knot and
CHIRP Suggests
distance to the ship astern was 2 cables. The Master asked
A yacht may be very hard to detect at night and in bad the vessel astern to move away, as own ship was having
weather; if in doubt, assume you haven’t been. Fit high
engine problems, which was refused. The main engine was
power (e.g. LED) lighting conforming to COLREG used to make headway, but did not get sufficient rpm. The
stipulations where you can, consider burning normal
port anchor was dropped to arrest the drag but this was
navigation lights in place of the masthead tricolour, and unsuccessful, so the port anchor was picked up. Vessel
take positive and ample measures in good timeto avoid
continued to use the engine, though at lower rpm and
collision in accordance with the COLREGS if the need commenced to pick up the starboard anchor with 7 shackles
becomes obvious. If illuminating a sail, continue (if
in the water. Once the starboard anchor was aweigh, the
possible) for an extended period. Passive radar reflec - stern speed increased but the engine rpm could not be
tors are unreliable; yachts should consider fitting active
increased sufficiently to arrest the sternway, resulting in own
reflectors. In ships, remember there are vessels at sea vessel’s starboard lifeboat deck area coming into contact
which are not required to transmit AIS data, even if they
with the other vessel.
can receive. In any event collision avoidance decisions
should be based primarily on visual and/or radar The lessons to be learnt
information. All vessels should avoid buying up precious Reporter’s suggestions to prevent similar incidents
time communicating (or trying to do so) on VHF. Proper anchor watch must be maintained at all times,
The above article was published in MFB44 whilst vessel is at anchorage.

Main engine shall be kept on immediate readiness in
Article. 30 crowded anchorages, or in anchorages where dragging
Collision Due to Dragging Anchor is possible due to the nature of the bottom, the current,

A vessel engaged in cargo operations with a barge, dragged topography, etc.
anchor and collided with another vessel that was anchored If there is a need to immobilise the engines, a thorough
astern. risk assessment must be carried out, giving due con -

sideration to prevailing circumstances and ships in the
What did the reporter tell us?
Vessel arrived and dropped anchor at Chittagong Roads for vicinity.
cargo operations. The Master, after assessing one tidal change, CHIRP Suggests
allowed the engine room to commence depressurising the See Notice to Mariners advice on anchorage at the Port
boiler for survey. The boiler economiser door was opened, the of Chittagong, whereby the ship’s engines are to be kept
main engine jacket pump was stopped and the valves for the on standby at all times.
jacket water were closed. During the night the Master relieved
the 3rd Officer from anchor watch on the bridge as he was See also GARD P&I Club advice: http://www.gard.no/
called to resolve a grab issue on deck. Content/20724691/Gard20Alert_Chittagong.pdf .
The above article was published in MFB45
The vessel started dragging anchor and this went un-
noticed. There was an anchor watch alarm on the radar and
this was acknowledged but not acted upon. Five minutes
Article. 31
later the anchor watch alarm on the 2nd radar sounded and
was acknowledged but again not acted upon. The Master The Control, Management and Use of
was preoccupied with the grab issues and at this time the ECDIS Systems in Ships
vessel had a stern speed of 0.9 knots. Shortly thereafter, the This article addresses aspects of the use of ECDIS in ships,
2nd and 3rd officers came on the bridge to discuss the grab drawing on a report about confusion between chart
issues with the Master and there was no effective anchor variants within a single ship’s system, brought to light
watch in place, as all were engrossed in the grab issue. when passage planning.

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