Page 32 - Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

for. The fleet took fifteen months to reach Bantam on Java and failed to reach the Spice Islands. After three years, the fleet returned with just enough pepper to cover the costs. Lack of experi- ence combined with the logistical complications of long distance trade and shipping caused many problems during this first voyage. Of the initial crew of , only  survived and one of the ships had to be abandoned half way because the fleet did not have enough crewmembers to man all four ships (Roeper & Wildeman , pp. -). Nevertheless, the fact that it was possible for Dutch ships to undertake a return voyage to Asia was a sufficient stimulus for other groups to fit out new fleets. In other cities of the Nether- lands, in Holland and Zeeland, companies were established and fleets were dispatched for direct trade with Asia. Between  and  no less than fourteen fleets,  ships in all sailed to the Asian market. All these companies, later called the Voor-Compagnieën (Pre-Companies), because they were the forerunners of the VOC, had the same structure as the Compagnie van Verre. Each voyage was treated as a separate enterprise. The participants or shareholders depos- ited their investment with the directors of one of the companies. They could not influence the management of the enterprise. Although in principle no permanent organisation could be built up, there was still continuity in the activities of the company if the money from one voyage was reinvested in the next. The new trade turned out to be so profitable that it almost collapsed under its own success. The Dutch trading companies were in competition with foreign traders, but at the same time they were competing with and obstructing each other, causing significant increases in the price of pepper and spices on the Asian market, whilst bringing down the price in Europe. The result was a weak economic foundation for what was a risky and costly enterprise. For the Staten Generaal (States General), the highest body of the then Netherlands Republic, this development was most unwelcome. They were also concerned about the political-military consequences of the war against the Iberian enemy in Asian waters. A well organised trading enterprise and a strong Dutch position in Asia would have its effect on the Spanish-Portuguese power. The States General had already made an attempt to persuade the merchants into collaboration as early as . Negotiations turned out to be difficult and slow since there was a lot of distrust from the smaller cities in the Netherlands towards the dominant position of Amsterdam. It took until  before the Voor-Compagnieën merged into one company under the full name Verenigde Nederlandse Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (United Netherlands Chartered East India Company) in this study referred to as the VOC. The final agreement to establish the VOC represented a political compromise. The VOC was a decentralised company that resembled the constitution of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, where cities and districts had a high degree of independence. The organisation was centred round the so-called Kamers (Chambers), representing the cities of the former Voor- Compagnieën. There were six Chambers: Amsterdam, Zeeland (Middelburg), Hoorn, Enkhui- zen, Delft and Rotterdam. Each Chamber had its own Board of Directors, with the VOC’s gen- eral management consisting of a central board of seventeen directors, the so-called Heren Zeven- tien (Gentlemen of Seventeen). Like the Republic of the Seven United Provinces (Netherlands), the Chambers also had a great degree of independence. They had their own facilities like ware- houses and offices and organised auctions of Asian products within the framework of prices and quantities agreed upon by the central management. However, all the activities of the var-  ious Chambers were dictated by a distribution formula laid down in the VOC Charter . Am- sterdam represented one-half, Zeeland one-quarter and the smaller Chambers one-sixteenth of all the activities. Political compromise was also the reason for the remarkable number of seven- teen central directors. Sixteen directors would have conformed to the distribution formula; however the fear of Amsterdam assuming a dominant majority position by virtue of its size, meant that Zeeland and the smaller Chambers had to have a seventeenth director to neutralise this power. This formula was applied to activities ranging from the building and equipping of ships to the division of Asian products shipped back to the Netherlands. In the administration of the VOC, egalisiatie (equalisation) was an important term that created many administrative and logistical challenges. It was often a complicated management assignment to load the agreed quantity per formula of the various Asian cargoes onto the ships returning to the re- spective Chambers. For that reason shipbuilding was very strictly regulated, particularly be-  Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters