Page 34 - Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

This kind of political conspiracy made it clear that a purely commercial trade arrangement would be impossible and that violence and confrontation would be inevitable, not least because the Dutch government was in favour of exporting the war against the Spanish and their allies to Asia. Notwithstanding this, the directors of the Voor-Compagnieën could not be persuaded to organise military action in Asia. On a more practical level however, the Dutch ships’ crews were quite keen to attack the Spanish and the Portuguese for their often very lucrative loot. The Dutch government sanctioned the capture of enemy ships and the division of a part of the spoils amongst the crew. Soon the capture of ships became an important strategy of Dutch- Asian trade: the capture of Portuguese ships proved to be a rich source of commodities such as porcelain from China. Sometimes, the Admiral appointed by the directors of the VOC as the commander of a fleet, could decide to use violence against the enemies of the local rulers with whom he was in negotiation about a trade contract, especially if the Portuguese were these enemies or allied with them. It is interesting to realise that inter-European relationships were sometimes somewhat confusing from the Asian perspective. Often, the Dutch had to prove their independence from their fellow Europeans, the Portuguese. The active and also passive military support of local rulers turned out to be a useful tool both in cementing Asian relationships and at the same time fighting the competition. In  Admir- al Steven van der Haghen assisted a local ruler in Ambon in his fight against the Portuguese in exchange for an exclusive trade contract in cloves. In reaction, the Portuguese sent a war fleet from Goa. They encountered with Dutch ships in the waters of Bantam. The Dutch won this first full-scale sea battle between European powers in Asia, but temporarily lost their strong- hold on Ambon. Shipping from the Netherlands to Asia had grown so rapidly that competition between the various Dutch companies also created problems in Asia. The competition between the many Dutch ships arriving in the same period drove prices up, while the prices in the Netherlands were under pressure when the supply of goods for auction sometimes turned out to be over- whelming. This, together with the desire of the Dutch government to organise military action in Asia, formed the background to the pressure the Government put on the various companies to unite under the banner of the VOC. In March  the Dutch State granted the VOC the rights to all trade and shipping in Asia. The policy towards the Portuguese and Spanish opponents changed with the establishment of the VOC. The Admirals of the first VOC fleets were sent off with instructions to provoke the enemy. The general aim of the VOC directors was to have outward-bound fleets attack the important Portuguese strongholds on their way to Asia. Once in Asia, they were expected to trade and return to the Republic. The first four fleets of the VOC (-) had first to lay siege to Mozambique, Goa and Malacca before they could then attack the Portuguese fortifica- tions at Ambon, and the Moluccas. It was clear that this plan was overly ambitious. Even if an attack was successful, it was difficult to sustain the new position of power. Every time they captured a Portuguese stronghold, as was the case in  at Ambon and in  at the Moluc- cas, the VOC had serious difficulties defending these places after the ships left for Europe. The VOC had to change their policy or their organisation in order to be successful in their attempts to monopolise the important spice trade. Not all the VOC investors supported this aggressive policy of the first years. Some of them objected to the excessive force of violence for religious reasons; others were just concerned about the commercial effects of this policy (Wes- tera ). The essential difference from the earlier practices of the Voor-Compagnieën was that finances were not settled at the end of every expedition; the directors could now reinvest any profit in a new equipage. In reality, this meant that the participants did not see any returns from their investments for many years. The opposition to use the VOC as an extension of the State policy against the Iberian enemy was growing. When in  the Republic signed a sus- pension of arms with Spain that excluded Asia, the government was forced to support the VOC in the continuation of hostilities on the other side of the world. They provided ships and arma- ments, but more importantly, they protected the VOC against their own investors who had become dissatisfied with the low return on their investments and were even calling for the VOC to be disbanded. The government’s support gave the directors the space to make changes in the organisation of the VOC.  Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters