Page 35 - Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

Building a permanent structure in Asia up to  The political structure Around  the VOC organisation was transformed from a ‘floating structure’ to a more per- manent establishment. Until then, the execution of the VOC’s activities in Asia were in the hands of the Admirals of the successive fleets. This system could easily lead to inefficient man- agement of an already complex organisation. It was almost impossible for the arriving Admiral to get a good overview of the whereabouts of the fleets and merchants. In this way it was very difficult to build up a position on the Asian market and to maintain a power base. Passing trade was not profitable and it was very hard to develop relationships with the local rulers. The solution to these problems came with the establishment of a permanent presence and structure in Asia. As early as  on the Spice Islands and  in Bantam, staff members  were left behind to organise trade in the absence of the fleet . In , Wybrand van Warwyck, the Admiral of the first VOC fleet, was allocated a stone building and a yard in a central posi- tion in Bantam. In fact, he established the first VOC headquarters in Asia with a mission head and a council. His instructions were to organise trade and shipping, to oversee administrative processes but also to hinder the Portuguese and to make preparations for Dutch families to be housed (NA .., VOC , fol. , ). From , the VOC appointed a Governor-General as the highest authority in Asia. The Governor-General was the head of a Raad van Indië (Coun- cil of the Indies) that formed the delegated government to oversee the interests of the VOC. In addition to pepper, the core business of the VOC was the trade in spices from the islands of the eastern archipelago. The main assignment of the first Governor-Generals, Pieter Both (-), Gerard Reynst (-) and Laurens Reael (-), was to obtain a mono- poly on spices. They were allowed to sign treaties but could also use force if that was thought to be appropriate. Through the earlier treaties made by various Admirals before , the VOC had the exclusive rights to buy cloves, nutmeg and mace. Since both the formal partners and legal background of the contracts were disputable, it was very difficult to exercise these formal rights. The VOC had to get heavily involved in local politics on the Spice Islands and the use of force became part of their trade policy in this area, a situation that did not always sit comforta- bly with all the VOC directors. Violence against the Portuguese and Spaniards in Asia was not an issue since the truce, that prevented a military confrontation in Europe, excluded Asia. The Spaniards were heavily attacked on the Moluccas and some military expeditions were sent to the Philippines in . Fighting another European competitor, the English East India Com- pany, was more complicated. Although, in the opinion of the VOC, they also violated their rights, since they refused to recognise the VOC’s claims in this area, the directors in the Repub- lic were not keen to use the force of arms against them because they did not want to lose the support of England in the European political arena. Instead of fighting them an attempt was made to turn the English competitors into partners. Governor-General Reael was not unsympathetic to such a solution. One of his council mem- bers, Jan Pieterzoon Coen, as Director General responsible for the trade policy of the VOC in Asia, had other ideas: his ambition to rule out all foreign shipping around the Spice Islands allowed little room for such co-operation. On the contrary, his policy was to head for a violent confrontation. The English East India Company had supplied local rulers with weapons and in  the capture of English ships led to direct conflict. The relationship with the Asian nations was no less complicated and full of dilemmas. If the VOC followed their strategy of banning all foreign shipping, they would also cut the region off from the traditional Asian shipping and trade. The Dutch would hardly be able to replace this lifeline of the inhabitants of the Spice Islands to essential supplies and import products. The local rulers would also not be pleased to lose their income through taxes on this trade. Once again the Governor-General Reael and the VOC directors in the Netherlands had conflicting opinions: Reael felt that by enforcing this ban on the region, the VOC would damage itself. He predicted serious economic consequences for the whole region if indeed the VOC failed to take The Dutch expansion in Asia up to  