Page 37 - Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters

in Asia but did not have a firm basis of operation to work from, the problems they encountered to combine trade and military actions are apparent. It is interesting to note that in this period the Governor-General often operated from the Spice Islands, using this area as the centre for political and military decision making; while the Director responsible for shipping and trade had his base in Bantam on the island of Java, a more central location that was accessible the year round. A so-called retourvloot (returning fleet or homeward bound fleet) sailed back to the Nether- lands annually. At first, ships sailed back alone or in small fleets, but later the VOC organised the return voyages in larger fleets only. Around , various ships had to abort their return trip to Europe or were even lost, because of their poor condition after their long service in tropical waters. Initially, the VOC directors were in favour of sending ships to Europe as soon as they were loaded, thus avoiding further weakening of the ships that had already been in the tropical waters for a long time. Soon they realised that better regulations could create greater advantages. Sailing in a fleet provided better support in the event that ships lost part of their rigging, were leaking or ran into other problems during their trip over the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Around  those problems were mostly solved because the ships were better adapted to their more specialist function and they also had a faster turn-around time in Bata- via. They were not often employed to sail on an intra-Asiatic route before they sailed home, as was common before . However, ships were still sent in convoy for mutual assistance but above all to make sure that all skippers stuck to the agreed route and sailing scheme that would bring the ships back in Europe before the Autumn. The VOC’s administration in Batavia endeavoured to dispatch a fleet around New Year for arrival in the Netherlands in the European summer. This was not an easy task since they had to deal with many variables, such as gathering the return cargo, planning the supply from the various trading posts and allowing enough capacity to ship the goods to Batavia. Shipping was organised in such a way that the various routes were synchronised; however, delays could easily occur as shipping routes were often subject to the monsoon. It frequently happened that the return fleet was delayed, waiting for other vessels to arrive from their various departure points. In the end, final decisions were based on economic considerations above regulations: to keep a fleet waiting created extra costs and risks, so sending the ships off on time was the usual choice. However, if cargo for Europe arrived too late from an Asian destination, storage in Batavia until the next return fleet meant more expenditure. The net result was that, although it was forbidden, ships were dispatched to Europe in the few months after the fleet had departed almost every year. The decentralised organisation of the VOC and specific demands from the Netherlands made the job of the directors in Batavia even more complex. They had to make sure that the requested volume of cargo was transported, but also that the volume was divided between the ships of the specific Chambers (Kamers) of the VOC in the Netherlands. They had to endeavour to en- sure that the cargo on a ship sailing back to Amsterdam, Zeeland or one of the other cities represented the correct ratio for the internal distribution of cargo. It was also important that the ships arrived in the Netherlands in the late summer, before the start of the stormy season, at a favourable time for the auctions but still with opportunities for ongoing transport connec- tions within Europe. An attempt to reorganise the Asian trade and shipping: - Developments up to  laid the groundwork for the growth of an extensive network in Asia. In regions like the Spice Islands, the VOC was able to establish a firm position that allowed them to dictate trade and shipping. Governor-General Coen’s determined objective was to ex- tend his influence militarily into Spanish and Portuguese controlled areas, but it became clear that success would come at a price with ramifications for trade and shipping. It seems that the VOC had over-estimated its capabilities and was forced to make fundamental decisions about the organisation of trade and shipping in Asia. The Dutch expansion in Asia up to  