Page 38 - 201109 - The 'X' Chronicles Newspaper - September 2011

; 15)3)45-1+ &: An Interesting Day: President Bush's Movements and Actions on 9/11 Continued from Page 37 No one knew exactly where the bogus story originated from, but “what can be safely said is that it served the White House’s immediate purposes, even though it was completely untrue.” [Telegraph, 12/16/01] What were those purposes? A well-informed, anonymous Washington official said, “It did two things for [Cheney]. It reinforced his argument that the President should stay out of town, and it gave George W. an excellent reason for doing so.” [Telegraph, 12/16/01] When Bush was asked in May 2002 why he had flown to two Air Force bases before returning to Washington, Bush said, “I was trying to get out of harm’s way.” [White House, 5/21/02] The most obviously bogus threat—the mole knowing secret codes—came from Cheney in a pivotal moment in his argument with Bush over where Bush should go. But were the other threats, for instance, the one made before Air Force One even took off, or the mph, the same speed Major Gen. Arnold said 12/16/01] airline suspected of crashing into Air Force fighters used to reach New York City earlier in Bush was taken to a secret and secure One, also bogus? the day when traveling a comparable distance place on the base. [Louisiana Life, Autumn [MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C), Slate, 1/16/02], the 2002] Shortly after 12:30 p.m., Bush taped a When Does the Fighter Escort Finally fighters should have reached Sarasota in about short speech, which he wrote on a napkin. Arrive? 10 minutes. Yet they took around two hours to [Louisiana Life, Autumn 2002, Salon, 9/12/01, reach Air Force One from when they were likely Washington Times, 10/8/02] The tape was Much like the time when Bush left the first needed, shortly after 9:00. broadcast on television at around 1:20 p.m. Booker classroom, the time when fighters This clearly goes beyond mere [Salon 9/11/01] He also “spent the next hour finally reached Air Force One is rarely incompetence, yet no newspaper article has ever and a half talking on the phone,” again arguing mentioned, and when it is, the facts are highly raised the issue. Was Cheney able to prevent the with Cheney and others over where he should debatable. According to one account, around fighters from reaching Air Force One, perhaps go next. [Sarasota Magazine, 11/01] The Secret 10:00 a.m. Air Force One was “joined by an to convince Bush not to return to Washington? Service felt the situation in Washington was still escort of F-16 fighters from a base near If so, why? Did Cheney assume (or know) that unsafe. [CBS, 9/11/02] Bush told Karl Rove: “I Jacksonville, Florida.” [Telegraph, 12/16/01] Bush was in no real danger? Like so many other want to go back home as soon as possible.” But one month later, it was reported that in questions surrounding 9/11, we do not know. Rove answered: “Our people are saying it’s Cheney’s 10:32 phone call, he told Bush that it unstable still.” [AP, 9/13/01 (D)] Bush was told would take another 40 to 90 minutes [as late as Barksdale Air Force Base he could get to the US Strategic Command noon] to get protective fighters up to escort Air center in Offutt, Nebraska, quicker than he Force One. [Washington Post, 1/27/02] Another Air Force One landed at Barksdale Air could fly to Washington, so he agreed to go to account said, “Air Force One headed toward Force base near Shreveport, Louisiana at about Nebraska. [Telegraph, 12/16/01, AP, 9/13/01 Jacksonville [at 10:41] to meet jets scrambled to 11:45 a.m. [CBS, 9/11/02, Telegraph, 12/16/01, (D)] give the presidential jet its own air cover,” but it Sarasota Magazine, 11/01] “The official reason Just after 1:00 p.m., Bush supposedly “received isn’t said when the plane actually met up with for landing at Barksdale was that Bush felt it an intelligence report from the base commander the fighters. [New York Times, 9/16/01 (B)] We necessary to make a further statement, but it that a high-speed object was headed for his know that when Air Force One took evasive isn’t unreasonable to assume that – as ranch in Crawford, Texas.” It turned out to be action around 10:55, there was no fighter escort. there was no agreement as to what the another false alarm. [Fighting Back: The War on NORAD commander Major General Larry President’s movements should be it was felt he Terrorism—From Inside the Bush White House, Arnold later said, “We scrambled available might as well be on the ground as in the air.” by Bill Sammon, 10/02, p.117] This may well airplanes from Tyndall [note this is near [Telegraph, 12/16/01, CBS, 9/11/02] Ironically, be another bogus report designed to explain Tallahassee, not Jacksonville, Florida] and then the landing came only a short time after Bush’s why Bush didn’t return to Washington at this from Ellington in Houston, Texas,” but he plane was finally protected by fighters. time, since US airspace was declared clear doesn’t say when. [Code One Magazine, 1/02] There was quite a difference in the except for some military and emergency flights In another account, the first two F-16s to arrive protection afforded Bush at Barksdale and what at 12:16 p.m. [USA Today, 8/12/02 (C)] By are piloted by Shane Brotherton and Randy was in Sarasota. Bush was left unprotected at a 12:30, the FAA reported that only about 50 of Roberts, from the Texas Air National Guard, not known location in Sarasota for nearly 30 these flights were still flying in US airspace, from any Florida base. [CBS, 9/11/02] All that’s minutes. At Barksdale, a location that was at the and none were reporting problems [CNN, known for sure is that by 11:30 there were six time unknown, Congressman Dan Miller “was 9/12/01, New York Times, 9/12/01], so how fighters protecting Air Force One. [Sarasota amazed at the armored equipment and soldiers could an unknown plane have been headed Magazine, 9/19/01] with automatic weapons that immediately toward Bush’s ranch 30 minutes after that? It would appear that fighters arrived surrounded the plane.” [Sarasota Magazine, some time between 11:00 and 11:30. These 11/01] Bush was driven to base headquarters in Continues on Page 40 fighters were supposed to be on 24-hour alert, a Humvee escorted by armed outriders. ready to get into the air in about five minutes. If Reporters and others remained under strict The ‘X’ Zone Radio Show Podcasts we assume the fighters flew at a speed of 1,100 orders not to give out their location. [Telegraph, www.xzonepodcast.com