Page 187 - Leadership in the Indian Army

Advisor and C-in-C of its Army. As the atrocities committed by Tikka
Khan’s troops in East Pakistan grew in intensity, so did the flood of
refugees streaming towards India. The international media, which initially

viewed India’s action in providing help to the Mukti Bahini as interference
in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country, slowly began to veer
around and articles documenting the horrible atrocities committed by
Pakistani troops began to appear in the press.
On the diplomatic front, the government went all out to convince the
world of the righteousness of India’s stand. Indira Gandhi visited several
foreign countries and personally briefed the heads of government. Except

the Soviet Union, none of the major powers supported India’s stand. In fact,
some were critical of her actions and the USA as well as China came out
openly in support of Pakistan. Indira Gandhi, realising the threat of
intervention by China as well as Pakistan, sent D.P. Dhar to Moscow with
feelers regarding obtaining support from the Soviet Union. The Russians
responded favourably and the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

Co-operation was signed on 9 August 1971. This was a major achievement
and effectively neutralised the threat from USA and Pakistan, giving India
considerable freedom in deciding her course of action.
The strategy for the operations in East Pakistan, as decided by Sam, was
to mount a multi-pronged attack, bypassing strongly held areas, with the
aim of capturing maximum territory in the shortest possible time. This was
essential because of the possibility of a UN sponsored ceasefire after a few

weeks. It was intended to liberate a large enough area to facilitate the
establishment of a Bangladesh government. The capture of Dacca or the fall
of the whole of East Pakistan was neither planned nor visualised at this
stage. The task of executing the strategy formulated by Army HQ was given
to Eastern Command, then headed by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh
Aurora, who had Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob as his Chief of Staff.

Three Army corps were to be used for the operation—2 Corps, under
Lieutenant General T.N. ‘Tappy’ Raina, (later General, and Army Chief)
was to advance from the west; 4 Corps, under Lieutenant General Sagat
Singh, was to enter from the east; 33 Corps, under Lieutenant General M.L.
Thapan, was to come down from the north; and 101 Communication Zone
Area, under Major General Gurbax Singh Gill, was to mount a subsidiary
thrust from the north-east.