Page 133 - GFA – A Different Drumbeat
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GFA – A Different Drumbeat 133

CHINA

SOE’s progress in China was interrupted by Chiang Kai-Shek’s expulsion of the
China Commando Group early in 1942. Killery had earlier been asked by London to
step up activity in China, although it was recognized that there was little scope for
special operations there because of the vast distances, the suspicious nature of the
Chinese, and later, competition from America’s OSS, which had prior rights in an
American-dominated theatre. He sent Findlay Andrew, who had spent many years in
the country and was a friend of most of the leading personalities, including Chiang
Kai-Shek, to Chungking ‘to influence Chinese politicians and keep China in the war,
and at the same time do whatever was possible to restore damaged British military
prestige’. He was later joined by Mr J. A. T. Galvin. For some time Findlay Andrew
was under the impression ‘that his was a genuine diplomatic appointment', although
he was paid by MEW and ostensibly managed that Department's affairs in China.

As the creation of new secret bodies in China was banned, he hit on the idea of
sharing in the work of the Institute of International Relations (IIR). This body, run by
General Wang Ping-Shen, a particularly close friend, was directly responsible to
Chiang Kai-Shek. It gathered intelligence in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories,
and put out subversive propaganda. (It had originally engaged in sabotage but
Chiang Kai-Shek had transferred this function to General Tai Li.) SOE made a
financial contribution (eventually one- third of IIR’s budget) and in return shared the
fruits of its labours, which gave Britain access to much of the intelligence collected
by the Chinese all over Asia. To give Findlay Andrew and Galvin proper standing
they were appointed advisers to IIR, in which the British component was code-
named the Research and Investment Institute (RII). Although the British pair had no
real authority, they could influence policy through their personal contact with Wang,
and through their subsidy. Findlay Andrew hoped that IIR might again carry out
sabotage, but it would have meant competing with Tai Li; and in any case Chiang
Kai-Shek's attitude to the China Commando Group showed that he had no wish for
British-sponsored sabotage. He made other conditions. There must be no American
participation, for he was anxious to play the British and Americans off against each
other.

The alliance with IIR was useful. According to Keswick, who was at this time
attached to the Embassy, the funds provided by SOE enabled IIR ‘to spread its
wings and establish itself widely throughout the East'. He believed that its
development, much faster than that of other Chinese services, was due not only to
British financial backing, but also to Findlay Andrew’s influence. At first there were
three operational districts. One included Shanghai, the coastal areas from Ningpo in
Chekiang Province south toSwatow, Macao, Tientsin, and Hankow. There were two
secret W/T stations in Shanghai through which IIR agents, co-operating with those of
Tai Li, provided local intelligence and also acted as a clearing-house for information
from Manchuria, Formosa, and Japan itself. The second district covered the five
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