Page 13 - Election Fraud in Korea-ENG-KOR

– One observer notes that people have been ‘brainwashed’ to believe that leftists vote more
during early voting than conservatives. However, the 2020 National Assembly results
revealed that more 60+ year olds (considered more likely to vote "conservative") voted
during the early voting period than younger people (considered more likely to vote for
the Democratic Party).

– Additionally, during the 2024 National Assembly election, in all 425 wards in Seoul the
DP candidate had the advantage in early voting. In 599 wards in Gyeonggi Province the
same thing occurred. Busan, Daejeon, and Gwanju showed similarly suspect results that
one lawyer said should warrant thorough investigation by the prosecutors’ office, to
include examining election management committee servers.
– Another expert noted: “While Democrats may be much more likely to show up at early
voting in certain areas, the probability of Democrats showing up at early voting locations
in the vast majority (98%) of precincts across the country is close to zero.”
– These and other statistical anomalies are raised by experts and they have put their work
‘out there’ to be challenged. Yet nobody does. Dismissing their assessment as baseless,
debunked, conspiracy theories is as suspicious as it is just lazy.

As mentioned earlier, when the former president of KAIST says “Either God did it or it was
rigged,” you’d think somebody would at least "check his work."

National Election Commission – Part of the Problem
The organization that should be responsible for ensuring this is checked is the National
Election Commission which has members that are close to the Democratic Party and seems
actively trying to stifle any investigation.
Suspicions of electronic and computer hacking to affect electoral outcomes in South Korean
elections were raised after the 2020 election and continue to be raised. Dr. Jang Jae-Eun, a
Korean Military Academy graduate, recently filed a lawsuit against five officials from the
National Election Commission’s IT team, citing them as key figures in potential election
fraud. The likelihood of success in this suit is doubtful, considering past experience of such
election integrity lawsuits.
Allegations concerning electronic manipulation were, in fact, made as early as 2019 when an
administrative lawsuit was filed demanding disclosure of the software and commands used
in early voting machines. The courts rejected the lawsuit. And the National Election
Commission has strenuously resisted efforts to insert transparency into the security of its
systems, to include ballot counting machines, ballot sorters, and NEC servers.
Indeed, NEC insisted – and continues to insist – that its networks and hardware and
software used to run South Korea’s elections are perfectly secure and cannot be hacked. This
of course only looks "outside in" and does not address what internal "bad actors" with access
to NEC systems might easily accomplish.
3
However, warnings and suspicions, being once ridiculed, about NEC networks deserve to be
taken far more seriously – if not as almost a certainty.

3 NEC’s claims of being ‘hack-proof’ ought to raise eyebrows, as it brings to mind the American Cyber
Security and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) insisting in 2020 that the US election was the “most secure
in history”, to include from outside hacking. And then two weeks later the US Government was hit
with the biggest hack in history. Who was responsible for preventing this? CISA.
And more recently, the US Government has admitted that China’s "Salt Typhoon" hacker group has
gained access to government systems and private telecom networks – after announcing that China’s
"Volt Typhoon group had insinuated itself into America’s critical infrastructure from 2021-2024.”

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