Page 16 - Election Fraud in Korea-ENG-KOR
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Lawsuits involving elections are handled by the Supreme Court. And because regional
election commission chairs are also judges, they are reluctant to challenge other judges –
and there’s also an obvious conflict of interest.
Judges often are unwilling or reluctant to hear election fraud cases. Sometimes it is because
of reluctance to involve themselves in sensitive political matters. But at other times it seems
like a wish to avoid addressing the merits of a case, or more like complicity in suppressing
challenges to the integrity of the electoral system.
There are reported instances where South Korean courts go to great lengths either to ignore
evidence before their eyes or to mischaracterize it.
For example, on occasions when recounts have been allowed, they have produced strange,
clearly irregular ballots. But the courts have simply ignored these, and even though lawyers
repeatedly demanded thorough investigations the courts have refused. And the ballot
anomalies have gone unmentioned in their rulings.
Lawyers pursuing claims of electoral fraud have frequently cited the courts’ unwillingness to
preserve evidence—especially critical in election-related cases—or to grant access to and
allow thorough examination of existing data and evidence. And in the case of election system
technology such as servers and ballot counting machines, they’ve presented an impenetrable
obstacle.
As mentioned earlier, the South Korean judiciary’s delay in taking up and resolving suits
claiming election irregularities within the legally required 180 days – if they even take the
case at all – is hard to square with the idea of a diligent, impartial judiciary that is interested
in maintaining the legitimacy of the electoral system.
Indeed, the right to bring challenges over fraud and wrongdoing in the electoral process and
to have timely resolution are basic features of free-and-fair elections and well-run electoral
systems – according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that serves as the basis of
international electoral law.
2024 Six Hour Martial Law and Cui Bono
Election integrity - or better said, concerns over election integrity – and the failure of South
Korean authorities, the political class, and the media to address these concerns played a role,
and arguably a key role, in South Korea reaching a boiling point.
Yoon felt he had no choice as the leftist opposition that overwhelmingly controls the National
Assembly was making the country ungovernable.
Yoon lifted the martial law order in accordance with constitutional procedures six-hours
after it was announced, but the damage was done – to South Korean society, the nation’s
reputation, to US-ROK relations, and of course to emerging trilateral relations.
One fairly asks, who benefits from the degradation and damage, the "entropic warfare" that
has been carried out in and against South Korea for at least the last seven years, and that
exploded when Yoon declared martial law?
More than anyone, it’s the People’s Republic of China.
One reasonably believes they encourage it, given the PRC's track record of employing
entropic warfare and political warfare from Washington to the Solomon Islands and beyond.
Turning a key American ally in Northeast Asia into a pro-China, pro-North Korea one-party
state would be a strategic achievement worth almost any price to achieve. And to include
working with allies in-country to manipulate the South Korean electoral system to benefit its
friends in the Democratic Party would be a dream come true.
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