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analysis highlights the necessity of disrupting North Korea
            and China’s ambitions to weaken the U.S. alliance network
            by fostering a defense-dominance situation, countering
            miscalculations, and averting simultaneous provocations
            in Northeast Asia. It also underscores the importance of
            preventing deeper military integration between North Korea
            and China through strategic pressure while advocating a more
            aggressive approach to disentangle North Korea-China ties.

            In Chapter Three, Colonel Grant Newsham (USMC, ret.),
            a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
            Studies, asserts that Beijing Prefers an Aggressive and
            Provocative North Korea, further arguing that North Korea,
            ruled by the Kim family regime, is of considerable value to
            China and that this value far outweighs any difficulties and
            headaches caused by the Kim family’s mercurial behavior.
            He believes, as a basic strategic matter, that China does not
            want a country that is democratic and allied with the United
            States (and hosting U.S. military forces) on its border, which
            would be the case if the Korean Peninsula was unified under
            South Korean control. This reason alone is enough for China
            to protect and support the Kim regime. But, he argues, there’s
            much more, seeing North Korea as an “excellent distraction”
            that would tie down U.S. forces in the event of a Taiwan
            contingency. The North Korean threat also creates a sense of
            “dependency” on China, whose cooperation (mistakenly, in
            Newsham’s view) is considered vital in Washington and Seoul
            when it comes to dealing with Pyongyang.


            Professor Narushige Michishita from the National Graduate
            Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo then discusses



        18  Section I : North Korea-China Relations: How and Why Does Beijing Protect and Empower Pyongyang?
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