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developing solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.
              While it has not demonstrated re-entry capability, its goal
              is to neutralize U.S. extended deterrence by securing the
              ability to strike the U.S. mainland. Other major strategic
              tasks included the development of “nuclear submarines” and
              underwater nuclear strategic weapons. The “Hero Kim Kun
              OK” submarine was launched at the Sinpo South Shipyard,
              demonstrating its capacity to launch SLBMs (submarine-
              launched ballistic missiles) with nuclear warheads. Moreover,
              the “Haeil”-1 and -2 nuclear unmanned underwater attack
              vehicles (UUAVs) were unveiled, showcasing their ability to
              navigate underwater for up to 71 hours.


            •   Strategic reconnaissance capabilities: In July 2023, North
              Korea revealed its latest drones, Saetbyol-4 and -9, which
              are replicas of U.S. unmanned attack aircraft but are
              significantly inferior in functionality. The more concerning
              threats are the “Chollima-1” space launch vehicle and the
              “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite. After three launch
              attempts, a successful launch experiment demonstrated that
              the “Malligyong-1” was functioning normally and capable
              of taking satellite photos of the United States and South
              Korea. Although the satellite’s resolution is 3-5 meters,
              insufficient for military intelligence, it can provide minimal
              independent targeting capabilities required for nuclear
              strikes.


            The mainstream view on the motivation behind North Korea’s
            nuclear development is security purposes against threats from
            South Korea and the United States. However, the argument
            that it was strategic judgment driven by concern about being



            Chapter Two : North Korea’s Nuclear Threat and China’s Backing for North Korea   33
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