Page 29 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

North Korea experts have described North Korea’s nuclear
weapons as a deterrent instrument, based on their rational
decision-making. But we cannot be certain that it will only be
3
used for defensive purposes or as a secondary strike option.
The sense of North Korea’s geographic proximity or long-
standing animosity differs from our expectations of rationality.
4
The “mirror image” trap we tried to avoid is still bounding us.

As a result, the hope that we can deter our adversaries may
be uncertain. The conclusion that a competitor will rationally
decide through a sequence of actions and reactions is not
theoretically supported. Different decision-making processes
are influenced by geopolitical conditions, alliances, domestic
political systems, historical experiences, and the strategic
cultures of each country. While nuclear strategy may seem
more logical when discussing concepts like an arms race,
mutual vulnerability, and strategic stability, there is no
common understanding of these concepts. This also holds true
for alliances; it is incorrect to assume that relations between
North Korea and China will be similar to those between
the United States and South Korea. Furthermore, merely
criticizing China’s protection and North Korea’s reliance on it
does not provide a solution.

3 Robert E. Kelly, “Why North Korea may use nuclear weapons first, and why current US policy toward
Pyongyang is unsustainable,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 21, 2023), https://thebulletin.
org/2023/11/why-north-korea-may-use-nuclear-weapons-first-and-why-current-us-policy-toward-
pyongyang-is-unsustainable/
4 Peter M. Swartz, Understanding an Adversary’s Strategic and Operational Calculus: A Late Cold War Case
Study with 21st Century Applicability (Alexandria: CNA Strategic Studies, 2013).

28 Section I : North Korea-China Relations: How and Why Does Beijing Protect and Empower Pyongyang?