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8/8           M97/February 2018  Reinsurance




                        As commercial contracts, reinsurance contracts are subject to the ordinary principles of construction and
         Subject to the
         ordinary principles of  these are set out, in brief, below:
         construction
                        • The primary rule of construction of the contract is that the court must give effect to the intention of the
                          parties. ‘Intention is determined by reference to expressed rather than actual intention’ (Deutsche
                          Genossenschaftsbank v. Burnhope (1996)).
                        • The starting point is that words should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. However, if the
                          meaning of the word(s) has been settled by the court, or if a word has a technical meaning, it is
                          presumed that such meanings were intended.
                        • ‘The ordinary meaning of words is the meaning when read, not in isolation, but in context.’ (The Law of
                          Insurance Contracts by Malcolm Clarke et al). Context may come from either within, or exceptionally,
                          outside the terms and conditions of the reinsurance contract.
                        • Extrinsic (or outside) evidence may be sought to elucidate technical meaning, to resolve ambiguity or
                          absurdity or, as envisaged by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich BS
                          (1998). In that case, Lord Hoffmann summarised the modern principles for the construction of
                          contractual documents.

                         His principles included:
                             1.  Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable
                                person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the
                                parties in the situation in which they were in at the time of the contract.

                             2.  The background … referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the ‘matrix of fact’ … includes absolutely
                                anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been
                                understood by a reasonable man…
                             4.  The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the
                                same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and
                                grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant
                                background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely
                                enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meaning of words which are ambiguous  Reference copy for CII Face to Face Training
                                but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever
                                reason, have used the wrong words or syntax.
                             5.  The ‘rule’ that words should be given their ‘natural and ordinary meaning’ reflects the common sense
                                proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in
                                formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that
                                something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to
                                the parties and an intention which plainly could not have had.

                        He, therefore, signalled a move away from a literal non-contextual approach, from ascertaining intention
                        from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language, towards a more commercial and common sense
                        (purposive) approach to interpretation. Indeed, his summary has been read as enabling the courts to
    8                   look at the surrounding circumstances more often than was previously the case.
    Chapter             In Dornoch v. Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance (2005), the Court of Appeal recognised the ‘dangers in

                        judges deciding what the parties must have meant when they have not said what they meant for
                        themselves’, especially in a situation where the parties selected for themselves an unsuitable standard
                        clause. In other words, the difference appears to be that the courts will now respond more readily to
                        evidence that the parties intended something different to what they had expressed. Further, if a
                        reasonable person in the position of the relevant party to a contract would be expected to understand a
                        term in a particular way, they will be bound by that understanding even if it does not quite correspond to
                        the normal or literal meaning.

                        In Rainy Sky v. Kookmin Bank (2011), the Supreme Court held that where a term of a contract is open to
                        more than one interpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation which is most
                        consistent with business common sense.
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