Page 37 - Mercian Eagle 2012

Brecon Foundation Paving the Way for Afghanistan Success
By Lt Jimmy Clark, OC Assault Pioneers, C Coy, 2 MERCIAN
Over the last twenty years the British Army has utilised one of the best arduous training areas in the United Kingdom, possibly in the world. At Brecon, Lance Corporals, Corporals and Lieutenants are trained in infantry skills and in command in order to tackle the challenges they face ahead.
following through the Afghan TAM headings, was the best way of covering everything.
Find
Patrol skills in conventional warfare compared with Afghanistan are completely different. Instead of arrowhead and half attack using sections, platoons split down into two multiples, are often forced into ‘Afghan snake’ due to the IED threat. Pushing out of the safe lane to find cover
and build up a fire position as taught
in Brecon is also, in some areas, too big a risk. Night patrols, the love of every Brecon DS, have been almost halted completely due to President Karzai’s directives. Light Infantry commanders must also be comfortable dealing with armoured vehicles adding complexity for
any junior commander’s plans.
It’s not only patrol skills which have
altered how the FIND effect is achieved, with a range of ISTAR assets sometimes at a junior commander’s disposal. Afghanistan is often the first time commanders tackle Surveillance Target Acquisition Plans. There’s not the time or the resources to teach the use of these assets or practices in Brecon. However it is essential to
master them in defeating the insurgency in Helmand.
Fix
At Brecon the FIX effect often comprises
of a section, perhaps with their section weapons supplemented with those from a different section in order to provide a weight of fire to suppress the enemy. In Afghanistan due to the COIN environment the FIX must be very different. Snipers and sharpshooters must FIX with carefully aimed shots taking into account the potential for collateral
damage. The preferred option however is to manoeuvre both to cut off enemy exfiltration in contact and to restrict insurgent freedom of movement through aggressive patrolling.
Strike
The Infanteers’ favourite and the focus
of a lot of Brecon training. But dropping
off a point of fire and posting grenades before following it up with a burst has (sadly?) been replaced in Helmand. The focus is on trained shots, sniper ambushes and precision AH strikes after a carefully executed targeting operation.
Exploit
The Brecon-taught EXPLOIT has more to do with searching the dead, processing POWs and digging in to hold gained ground. In Afghanistan the EXPLOIT involves Biometric Enrolment, Combat Damage Assessments, Compensation claims and Shura organising. Because our superiority in the STRIKE is assumed it is the EXPLOIT which gains a large proportion of MST and PDT time and one which, crucially, Junior Commanders must succeed in to capitalise on their earlier, more aggressive action.
Obviously it’s impossible to cover the spectrum of experiences in both the Brecon training establishment and on Operations
in Afghanistan but above are a few of the key issues I have identified. Soldiers’ fitness must be good enough to perform to a high standard in the harshest environments
on earth. Destroying or suppressing an enemy using accurate fire on multiple weapon systems will always be a top priority. Administration of kit and self and maintaining morale, even in the dark times, are also both crucial: all key on Brecon,
all key in Helmand, all key in any battle
we fight. In conclusion, with MST training, RSOI, a good handover and a bit of luck Brecon trained Infanteers at all levels are well prepared for current Operations and those in the future.
Brecon courses are aimed at training junior leaders for ‘a’ war rather than ‘the’ war. Yet after over ten years in Afghanistan and our commitment to the second Iraq war only recently concluded,
recruits to the courses
have had very different
experiences of modern
warfare. Soon after they
complete their training
in Brecon almost all
will see active service
now predominantly
in Afghanistan. How
then does Brecon train
Section Commanders
and Platoon Sergeants
and Commanders for
the current ‘front line’? Having recently returned from Herrick 15 there are a number of personal observations that I have made.
Orders
For Lieutenants at Brecon, this is their raison d’etre, but it’s key in the syllabus
at all levels. Coming up with a plan and executing it, whether in contact or on a deliberate attack are bread and butter
for junior commanders. All are taught to have their TAM handy and carefully work through all of the headings in order to brief correctly. Although Corporals and Sergeants in training rely more on experience than process, the seven questions remain a key checklist. On Herrick 15 the ‘Afghan TAM’ provides a framework for orders for patrols but it is much shallower in some areas whilst emphasising others like CASEVAC plans. I found however that for anything beyond the routine a full seven questions estimate, followed up by a thorough brief
it’s not only patrol skills
which have altered how the FinD effect is achieved, with a range of iSTAr assets sometimes at a junior commander’s disposal.
D (Fire Support) coy
Planning for the Future by Maj JH Skillen, J5 Plans, CF BURMA
On Op HERRICK 15, 2 MERCIAN BG deployed to the Upper Gereshk Valley as CF BURMA, replacing a USMC contingent of approx 900 troops with a significantly lower number of 300 troops. The presence, therefore, of ANSF was significant to ensure the correct force ratio within the AO. This short article attempts to describe the efforts that were taken to improve the planning capacity and integration of the ANSF.
Background
2 MERCIAN BG deployed to Combined Force BURMA in the Upper Gereshk Valley as a one over one battlegroup (one HQ commanding
one Coy HQ). Their role was to PROTECT the operationally significant Route 611, the route that ran north from Highway 1 to Sangin and beyond to Kajaki. This would allow the US Task Force
THE MERCIAN EAGLE
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