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operating in the north to resupply their troops whilst they continued to CLEAR the Helmand River Valley from Sangin to Kajaki. The CF BURMA AO covered approx 30km of road, and was bordered by the NES Canal in the west, US forces deployed in Sangin in the north and CF NES North in the south. CF BURMA deployed under a restrictive 300 pax manning cap and having replaced approximately three times that number of US Marines on handover, the presence of ANSF was significant.
Working alongside CF BURMA were two Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Kandaks (Kdks) and a Tolay of ANA. The ANCOP Kdks primarily occupied check points (CPs) along Rte 611 and the ANA primarily occupied CPs in the Green Zone (GZ). As the J5 Plans officer, it was my role to mentor and improve the planning capability of the ANSF, including integration of ANCOP and ANA on operations.
ANSF Planning
Those with any experience of working with ANSF will know that they have an extremely hierarchical structure. Therefore decision making and planning is very unwieldy, command structures are too rigid and little, if any, mission command is given to subordinate commanders. The result is that if decisions are made or discussed with subordinate commanders they must be ratified by the chain of command prior to any action taking place. So despite the amount of detailed planning completed, without the Kdk Comd’s (or in some instances Brigade Commander’s) authorisation an operation will not take place. This is extremely frustrating and time consuming, both in planning time and production of operational staff work.
ANSF, the iJOC concept started to gain the confidence and trust
of the ANSF. CO CF BURMA also held a weekly commanders’ shura in the iJOC, which both ANCOP Kdk Commanders and the ANA Tolay Commander attended. This allowed discussions and decisions to be made at the correct level, ensured ANSF ‘buy in’ to upcoming operations and cemented the support of the ANSF for the iJOC. The weekly meeting, led by CO CF BURMA, concentrated on the campaign plan for the AO (both kinetic and non-kinetic operations) and encouraged the ANSF commanders to express their thoughts on the future of security in the AO. Finally, the discussions ensured that liaison was conducted amongst all units and that vital information was passed across the whole CF AO.
Progress
Although still in its infancy, progress was made in the planning capability and willingness of the ANSF. However as the confidence of the ANSF built in the iJOC concept all HQs provided a full time presence, allowing information to be disseminated immediately thus concentrating the effort. Daily J2/J3/J5 updates became better attended and rather than ISAF providing all the information, ANSF units would also provide information that they had gleaned from local nationals, which proved to be accurate and relevant and allowed them to input into upcoming operations.
Encouraging ANSF commanders to meet once a week and to discuss the long term plans for the AO ensured that the correct level of authority was granted for tactical operations, and therefore circumvented the initial frustrations associated with the hierarchical
Forward planning and thinking through one’s actions to the end is not a practice routinely adopted by ANSF commanders; they are reactive in their nature rather than proactive. This tends
to lead to the same reaction to all incidents and therefore pattern setting that provides the insurgent with an easy target. The rotation of ANCOP Kdks every three months also compounds the inertia
This tends to lead to the same reaction to all incidents and therefore pattern setting that provides the insurgent with an easy target.
nature of ANSF. ANSF feedback also ensured that all actions coincided with the ‘Afghan plan’ for the longer term stability of their own country. Gaining the authority and trust of the chain of command unlocked the path to allow ANSF subordinate commanders and ‘staff’ officers
to work closely with their respective mentors
to carry out detailed planning for upcoming operations. Integration of ANA and ANCOP on specific patrols was continually encouraged and during the final stages of HERRICK 15 both had agreed that this could be advantageous and were willing to work together.
to think and plan ahead and consider the targets
and milestones to be achieved three, six and
twelve months ahead. This leads to a parochial
view of the campaign in the area and also of
transition: they simply tend to fight the battle in
front of them without consideration for the longer-term effects. Finally, without prompts, liaison amongst ANSF is severely limited and therefore significant overlaps and nugatory effort occur. With a mechanism in place to allow facilitated face to face conversations, unity of effort can be achieved (maybe only limited unity, but an improvement) and integration of ANSF operations between organisations can be encouraged.
Finally, ANSF battle procedure had improved drastically and following the detailed planning, ANCOP Kdk
Commanders and the ANA Tolay Commander would attend and participate in ROC drills and orders groups. The commanders were clear on their part in the plan and were enthusiastic to discuss the operation with the other units, ensuring that the operations were successful.
There is still much that the ANSF must learn when planning. There is the importance of forming a link with the area co-ordinating operational HQ as well as their individual chain of command to ensure continuity and unity of effort, and also the importance of ensuring resources are allocated according to priority and the concept of mission command, to name but a few. However, despite the frustrations, comfort could be taken in the progress made during the length of HERRICK 15 and the real sense of feeling that transition, on the micro scale, had begun.
Conclusion
Given the opportunity and plenty of encouragement, the ANSF are willing to consider the ‘long game’ when it comes to campaign planning. Institutionally they have been reactive in their posture and
a great deal of painstakingly slow and frustrating work is required
to break their old habits. The key to success in planning is twofold: constant encouragement and engagement at the highest level by senior commanders and intensive and relentless mentoring at the lower levels. This will allow for ‘buy in’ and coherence with the ‘Afghan plan’ at the higher levels and provide the authority for subordinates to carry out detailed planning, facilitated by mentors, at the lower levels.
The ANSF are keen to progress and to accept responsibility for what is rightfully theirs; the land and people of their own country. With the right tools and the knowledge of the ‘Afghan plan’, the ANSF have sown the seeds of promise for a co-ordinated and long lasting plan for stability and security.
iJOC
To provide a single point of focus for all J2/J3 and J5 and allow a link with the OCC(D) to be formed, thus commencing the formation of
a long-term relationship with the legacy Afghan campaign planning HQ, CF BURMA created an intermediate Joint Operations Centre (iJOC). This was little more than a tent surrounded by HESCO
to provide limited protection, therefore in terms of infrastructure
very limited. A model pit was created at the rear of the iJOC to
allow CF planning and orders but also to encourage ANSF to use
it for the same purpose. However simple the infrastructure, the concept enabled a location that could be occupied by all HQs of
all units in the AO and therefore allow an all informed method of conducting operations. The iJOC was intended to be simple in terms of infrastructure as it could become a legacy HQ when ISAF withdraw from the area. ANSF HQs were therefore encouraged to install their own communications system and all other planning and reporting were displayed on boards or carried out around a bird table. That said, the ISAF watchkeeper within the iJOC did have access to JCHAT and secure telephone communications to allow real time updates that could be distributed to the ANSF, allowing the information to be distributed to all on the ground.
Slowly, through continual mentoring and encouragement and ISAF providing vital support functions such as fire support, reinforcement of ANSF with QRF and CASEVAC when incidents were reported by
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