Page 150 - Rifles 2017 Issue No 3

JUST A FEW MINUTES CAN ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY, AND THE WISDOM OF THE NARRATIVE
Last autumn, HQ staff and regimental representa- tives from 38 (Irish) Brigade visited Northern Israel for a battle eld study. In this article Lt Ashwin Bhardwaj, a Platoon Commander at F Company 7 RIFLES, talks about the Syrian front during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Travelling through Israel is a surreal experience. Towns and place names are familiar from history, theology, rugby songs and news stories, so as we crossed the Jordan River and headed towards the Golan Heights, it felt like stepping into legend.
No British forces were involved in the Yom Kippur War, but as a con ict between a manoeuvrist defender, and Soviet-tactics aggressor, it has always interested military strategists. Our hosts were retired Israeli soldiers who had fought in these battles, and who founded the Institute for Advanced Military Thinking (IAMT) to bring proven combat success to military doctrine and research.
During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria. On October 6th 1973, Syria tried to take it back. Israeli intelligence knew that Syria would only do so when Egypt attacked in the Sinai Peninsula, but they mistakenly thought that such an attack was months away.
Despite an unusual build-up of Syrian troops, Israel was reluctant to mobilise reservists during the festival of Yom Kippur. Nonetheless, regular reinforcements were sent to bolster the defensive line of mine elds, tank-traps, ditches and bunkers.
Syria’s initial assault pitched three divisions against just two Israeli brigades. In the open terrain of the southern sector, Israel’s 188th “Barak” brigade was completely wiped out, and in the northern sector, where the terrain better suited the defender, the 7th Armoured Brigade barely survived.
Three factors turned the course of battle: Mission Command, reserve mobilisation and training. Syrian eld of cers fought bravely, but could not exploit success on the ground because of a rigid command structure. Their generals were 70km to the rear, maintaining their political in uence in Damascus, so when the Syrian Army broke through in the south, the advance was halted whilst commanders awaited permission to advance. The momentum was lost and when the Israelis counter-attacked, they were unable to adapt.
This was in stark contrast to the Israeli Defence Forces, whose divisional commander was so far forward that his staff formed anti-tank platoons to repel an attack. Company commanders were given free-reign within their Commanding Of cer’s intent,
as in exibility could be fatal on such a fast-moving battle eld.
“War is chaos and mummy and daddy are at home,” says Major (retired) Ran Ginosar, who was an infantry commander in 1973, “So make the decisions yourself and don’t bother the Brigade or Company Commander. They have their own problems.”
The Syrians expected to have 72 hours before the Israeli Reserve mobilised, but rather than waiting to be deployed as pre-arranged units, tank crews headed into battle as soon as they were ready. The rst reinforcements trickled onto the Golan within 12 hours, slotting into composite units or joining up with remnants of the Barak Brigade. Within three days, the entire Israeli Reserve had been mobilised.
Israeli crews drilled rigorously in the months before the war: their tanks were ring two or more shells for every Syrian shot. They also let the Syrians get close before opening re, offsetting the Syrian advantage of night-vision and numbers.
When the Syrians eventually withdrew on the fourth day, Israel’s 7th Brigade was down to seven tanks (from nearly 100), most of which had run out of ammunition. The difference between victory and defeat was a matter of minutes. Israel regrouped and launched a counter attack that drove to within 40 kilometres of the Syrian capital, Damascus and, on 25th October, the UN-brokered peace deal put an end to hostilities.
There are obvious lessons to draw from the Yom Kippur War: mission command and mobile defence can overcome superior enemy numbers; a well-trained reserve is needed to win the war; and combat service support is as important as combat troops (Israeli mechanics repaired their tanks so quickly that their “losses” exceeded 100%).
There are more subtle lessons, too, about what we learn from a battle. The legend of the Yom Kippur War is one of dogged defence and adaptable commanders. But, if the Syrians had persevered for just a few more hours, the Golan might have been overrun. The story would have become one of intelli- gence failures, chaotic leadership, and an under-re- sourced Army. Just a few minutes can alter the course of history, and the wisdom of the narrative.
Some hours later, we stood atop Mt Hermon, at an Israeli listening post that overlooks the road to Damascus. Israeli paratroopers recaptured from Syria on the penultimate day of the war. In the valley below us explosions boomed, rockets streaked and smoke rose from villages, as Syria’s brutal civil war rumbled into its seventh year.
“Seeing that every day reminds me of the fragility of security,” said the Israeli major in charged of the station, “It reminds me that we can never be complacent, when destruction lies just over the border.”
Perhaps that was the nal lesson in how the Israelis won the war. They weren’t just following orders or holding ground. They were ghting for their nation’s survival.
Lt Ashwin Bhardwaj, F Coy
38 Brigade Battle eld Study to Israel – The Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War
PERHAPS THAT WAS THE FINAL LESSON IN HOW THE ISRAELIS WON THE WAR. THEY WEREN’T JUST FOLLOWING ORDERS OR HOLDING GROUND. THEY WERE FIGHTING FOR THEIR NATION’S SURVIVAL
148 SEVENTH BATTALION
THE RIFLES