Page 364 - UAE Truncal States

I

The Formation of the Federation

preparing lo assume the role of the major military power in the Gulf,
it was ready to make this sacrifice for the sake of stability and of good
relations with Arab neighbours. But having climbed down once, it
would have been very difficult for Iran lo renounce its claim over the
islands Abu Musa and the two Tunbs.9
Bahrain had been the test case for Britain’s ability lo settle any
outstanding disputes within the area before vacating and leaving the
governments and people lo their own devices. Thus after summer
1970 the outlook was brighter and the various parties gained
confidence while preparing themselves for the future after December
1971. The replacement of the oppressive and unco-operative Sa’Id
bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, by his son Qabus also
contributed lo the air of optimism.

Speculation that the Conservatives might reverse
policy
If the establishment of the federation combining the small Gulf
States into an internationally-recognised politically viable entity was
being delayed, this was again largely due to domestic politics in
Britain. The Labour decision to withdraw from east of Suez was
strongly criticised by most Conservatives. Withdrawal from the Gulf
in particular was portrayed by many leading opposition politicians
as an error in all respects: military, economic, and political. It was
seen as an invitation to the Soviet Union to extend its influence to the
waters of the Gulf. In Parliament and elsewhere the decision to
withdraw from the Gulf in unseemly haste was described as a stab in
the back of the pro-western governments who, it was feared, would
fall prey to Cairo-orientated left-wing propaganda. Many Conserva­
tives also pointed out that the argument that Britain could not afford
the cost of maintaining troops in the Gulf was not valid. The cost to
Britain of maintaining its military, naval and air presence in the Gulf
was then some £16 million, while British investment in the area,
particularly by petroleum companies, was many times that figure.
Also in 1966 Britain imported almost half its requirements of oil from
the Gulf. The Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Mr Reginald
Maudling, visited the area early in February 1968. Other Conserva­
tives followed and in April Mr Edward Heath himself held talks with
Arab and Iranian leaders. This activity left the impression that the
Conservatives were so deeply opposed to the withdrawal that they
would reverse the decision if and when they came to power.
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