Page 369 - UAE Truncal States
P. 369

Chapter Nine

                  ing ns one federal Slale or union. Il was not a constitution but more
                  the expression of an intention. There was no provision for a cabinet
                  of ministers, either in the draft or in the agreement. The legislative
                  power was reserved to the Supreme Council, consisting of the nine
                  Rulers.19 The Supreme Council was to draw up a constitution, to
                  formulate the policies of the State, to “legislate federal laws required
                  in this connection”20 and to prepare an annual budget.
                    The executive body of the federation was to be the “Federal
                  Council".21 In the draft this Council was intended to resemble a
                  parliament, and three councils concerned with defence, economy and
                  culture were to report to it. In the agreement the role of the Federal
                  Council was considerably reduced, and it was to operate under the
                  close supervision of the Supreme Council.22 The composition of the
                  Federal Council was to be left to be decided by law.23
                    The part of the agreement, entitled “General Rules", addressed
                  itself first to the need to co-operate in defending individual Emirates
                  and the State as a whole against external agression; secondly to the
                  Supreme Federal Court, whose functions were specified only in the
                  draft; thirdly to the need for the Supreme Council to decide on its
                  permanent headquarters; fourthly to the reservation to each Emirate
                  of the right to manage its own internal, non-federal affairs; and
                  finally to a provision that the Supreme Council could amend the
                  agreement “particularly if the amendment tends to make ties among
                  the member Amirates stronger.”24 As proposed in the draft, il was
                  decided that the agreement should come into force on 30 April 1968
                  and remain in force until superseded by a permanent charter.25
                    The comparison between the draft and the eventual text of the
                  agreement shows that, while the draft avoids rash unification of
                  administrative powers and abstains from aiming at a textbook
                  constitution which would have had no prospect of being adopted by
                  the nine Rulers, let alone of being implemented by the admini­
                  stration, the three days of bargaining by the Rulers and their
                  advisers in Dubai resulted in an even more vague document. All
                  participants in the Dubai meeting were very much in favour of
                  seeking strength in unity, but some had reservations about signing
                  away their prerogatives and sharing their own State’s achievements
                  and wealth. Others realised that although this agreement did not
                  provide for the enforcement of members’ participation, it was  a
                  foundation on which to build, in time and with much patience, a
                  functional federal Stale.
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