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121. Abdul Aziz, taking what was obviously the correct course, proceeded to
the nearest Telegraph Offico, at Suk-es-Shuyukh, and, put himself into comuni-
cation with the Vali of Basrah, to whom lie complained of the misdeods of
Sadun, a Turkish subject, and demanded redress. This Mohsin Pasha promised
with alacrity, but ho does not seem to have taken any energetic steps to carry
out his undertaking. Sadun was said at (ho time to have tied into tho marshes,
but from his subsequent movements, it is evident that he could have retired
to any very great distance from the desert path to Koweit. After somo days’
fruitless waiting, Abdul Aziz got impatient and threatened that, unless the Wali
procurod him immediate satisfaction, ho would proceed forthwith to Koweit,
and take it out of Mubarak, whom ho regarded as tho real author of tho attacks
made on him.
122. The main facts were telegraphed by Mr. do Bunsen to London on tho
1st November, with a recommendation that a gunboat should go to Koweit to
watch events. A previous telegram from Consul Shipley had reported matters
at Koweit to be quiet and hostilities suspended ; and a subsequent message
(dated 2nd November) from Mr. de Bunsen withdrew his recommendation on
the ground that the situation had improved, and that the Amir had promised
to remain quiet pending settlement of his claims by an Imperial Commissioner.
On tho 9th November, thereforo, the India Office recommended to the Foreign
Office that no further action should be taken for tho present; but a less reas­
suring account of the state of affairs having been received from the Admiralty
on the following day (ICth November), the India Otfico again addressed tho
Foreign Office (14th November), suggesting that a British Agent should bo
sent in a ship of war to ascertain tho true state of affairs and to endeavour to
warn the Amir of Nejd that no attack on Koweit would be allowed. It was
further suggested that should it prove impossible to resist a laud attack with
the force available at tho moment, the Sheikh should bo offered a refugo and
steps taken rs soon as possible to repulse the invaders. Further news was
received on the same day that an attack on Koweit by the Amir of Nejd was
considered improbable, but possible ; and that the Turks were reinforcing their
garrison at Basrah. The Foreign Office agreed to tho despatch of a gunboat,
but added that no active measures should bo taken without further reference
to Her Majesty’s Government. The Government of India wore then instructed
in Secretary of State’s telegram dated lfitli November 1900—
“ Foreign Office arc informing Admiralty that vessel should he detailed to take an Agent
to Koweit to enquire state of affairs and endeavour
No 45 of Secret E , February 1901, No*. 22«I07.
to warn Nejd Amir, if necessary, not to attack
Koweit. Preliminary steps will be taken by Admiralty to protect Sheikh if attacked, but no
active measures tor this purpose will he taken and no force landed to expel invader without
further reference to ller Majesty’s Government. I presume you will inform Naval Com-
mandcr-in-Chief and send Resident, Bushirc.”
123. Meanwhile Mubarak’s warlike preparations had been completed, and
he proceeded to march northwards to meet Abdul Aziz. Thalib Pasha was then
again despatched by the Vali of Basrah in hot haste to hold him back, but found
he had already started. A.t the same time reinforcements were sent to the Tur­
kish troops in the Muntetik district, both from Basrah and Bagdad, and Saiyicl
Ahmed Pasha was sent along with Ali Bessam, the Amir’s Basrah Agent, o
see Abdul Aziz, and do their best to induco him to go home, and leave ns
grievances in the hands of tho Turks.
124. Sadun was now atSakria, and Abdul Aziz near Samaya in the Vilayet
of Baghdad. The forces of Mubarak and Sadun effected a junction without.
much difficulty, and once united wero
Politicnl Resident’* telegram dated 1 Ith November
1900, No. 42 o£ Secret E., February l'JOl, No*. equal, if not slightly superior in number,
22107. to the troops Abdul Aziz then had on tlio
spot. This consideration, joined to the presence of a considerable Turkw ‘ orc®
ready to intervene, if necessary, put additional weight to the Vali s or£u[”c
I in favour of peace ; for, in Arab warfare, it is customary to. forco on a ‘
1 only when in overwhelming numbers, and in this case tho inferior si e /
anticij ates the fray by a timely retreat. Anyhow, both parties agreed ? .
home, the Amir making the first move. Mubarak was accompanied ou n
ward journey by the Mutessarif of Muntetik just to sec him sate b k
premises, and through this official, an interviotv was arranged between