Page 113 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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mancnl protectorate, and that Komball would visit Kowoit fo nettle-details. In that case ho
hoped for visits of Ilritieli India steamer. Sheikh said Wali had urged him to accept Turkish
ofticcr and garrison, but he had rofused. Kemball and AVratislaw concur in regarding this as
principal object of recent visit of Wali. Komball fays Turks may possibly take no further
action for present, but that they will not let matters rest for long, and thinks that presens
may be best opportunity for assuming protectorate, which he regards sooner or latter as cer­
tain.
My views arc as follows:—Sheikh in making those overtures is of course actuated by pure-
ly selfish motives. Ho is afraid of Ncjd. He realises that Turkish protection means Turkish
garrison; and he tnrns to us as least exacting of his neighbours. There is reason to think
that he has also been coquetting with Russia and possibly France. We nre precluded at
present by agreement of January I>S99 fiom throwing him over in favour of Amir. Two
courses appear to be open. First is to declare open protectorate over Koweit, to which sanc­
tion of Foreign Office was reported in your telegram of 21th December 1893, but withdrawn
in your telegram of Gth January 1399. In ray opinion this inevitable ultimate solution. We
should then be responsible for Sheikh, and could insist on reparation to Ncjd; but we should
also be hound to protect him against both Turkey and Ncjd, neither of whom would dare to
move in such a case. Turkey might be said to have impelled tip to such a step by Wall's
proposals, in face of O’Conor’s reiterated warnings. Foreign Office will know whether
objections raised by O'Conor in January 1899 still bold good.
Second alternative is to maintain patch work status quo, to tell Sheikh that no chango in
out position towards him is contemplated, to urge hiui to compensate Nejd, which he will pro­
bably decline to do, unless wo find the money, and to warn Turkey that we cannot tolcrato
cither Turkish officer or garrison at Koweit. These proposals are makeshift. They will not
stop intrigue, and they cover a policy which in last resort is indistinguishable from protector­
ate.
As regards Amir of Ncjd, I agree that, while unable to concede his roqust, we should not
alienate his sympathy. He is seeking to discover from which patron lie can get best terms,
Turkey or ourselves. I would suggest private mission to him of British officer from side of
Akaba, so as to avoid Turkish suspicions, to be arranged confidentially through Amir’s agent
at Busrah. We could explain inability to deposo Mubarak because of agreement, but could
undertake to restrain latter from future aggression, and to use good offices to prevent Turkish
aggression on Nejd. Amir’s views about arms and railways might also be more fully ascer­
tained. Much depends on personality of Amir of which wo know little at present.”
146. In reply* to this telegram the Secretary of State in his telegram of 28tli
June I901stated that His Majesty’s Gov­
No. 136 of Secret E., October 1901, Nos. 181—315.
ernment were unwilling to incur tho em­
barrassment which might result from the declaration of a protectorate over
Nejd or Koweit.

XIX-—(1) Threatehed attack on Koweit by Amir hf Nejd and the
Turks. (2) Measures for defence of Koweit. (3) Attempt to settle
differences between the Sheikh and Amir amicably.

July—October 1901.

147. The question then was what was tho answer to be returned to tho Amir No. 197.
of Nejd and the Sheikh of Koweit. Ilis
Secret E., October 1901, Nos. 181—315.
Excellency tho Viceroy therefore asked
for instructions in telegram, dated 1st July.
148. The Secretary of Stato wished to bo enlightened futhcr and tclegra- Ko. 2i6.
phed as follows on 23rd July :—
“ As His Majesty's Government have decided not to proclaim a Protectorate over Koweit,
the immediate problem is the discovery of means of maintaining our hold over the Sheikh,
and at tho eamo time finding a modus vivendi between the Sheikh and the Amir. At present
Wratislaw seems to think that the Amir is disposed to treat with us and a settlement possible,
wliilo the season provents hostility against Koweit. Other factors in tho settlement depend
on local knowledge, and, thcroforc, Kemball should be despatched to Kowoit to study position
carefully and report facts, and make suggestions for a satisfactory settlement. It may here­
after be necessary to warn Aniir that, while anxious to effect amicable solution, we cannot
illow Koweit to bo attacked by Ncjd. Kemball ahou d remain at or near Koweit to carry out
iny instructions that may be sent when ho has reported on tho situation.”

• Fide Appendix Q.