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                                 Reforms and unrest1923
            CONFIDENTIAL.                                                P                   ;

                                                                  1*22$           i I        ;

                     No. 222-S., dated Buahiro, tho 11th (rccoivcd tho 22nd) May 1923. I__   :■ !} £ }f /
                 Froin—Tho IIon'ulb Lieutenant-Colonel S. 0. Knox, C.S.I., C.I.B., Political   J
                       Rooidcnt in tho Poraian Gulf.
                               Subject.—Bahrain Reforms.
               I have tho honour, to invite your attention to my telegram No. 421 of tho 9th
           May in which I briefly put forward my reasons for doubting tho expediency of
           carrying out the contemplated reforms in Bahrain in the present stato of affairs
           in the Gulf. The object of this despatch is to amplify that telegram.
               Tho Government of India will appreciate that when I sent you my telegram
           No. 417 of the Oth May I was unaware that tho inattcr had been decided. Never­
           theless I have such lively doubts as to the necessity for introducing reforms in tho
           itnmcdiato present and such grave misgivings as to tho outcomo of such a policy,
           tho results of which may go far indeed beyond tho mere local embarrassment of
           having to use forcible means of intervention, that I trust I may be pardoned if
           even at this late stage I beg that the whole question may be reconsidered.
               2.  I am quoting Colonel Trevor almost literally when I say that lie quito
           candidly regarded the position in Bahrain as offering only a choice between two
           ovils. die was of the opinion that the reforms would almost certainly not bo
           introduced except under the strongest material compulsion by us, and ho realized
           that our forcible intervention in Bahrain would attract much hostilo criticism.
           On the other hand, he anticipated that the early introduction of reforms would securo
           some positive advantages which, in his view, on the whole outweighed the drawbacks.
           These advantages wero » itly, that Persian attacks, on our management of affairs
           in Bahrain might ceaso, and secondly, that some actual good would remain to our
           credit in the removal of flagrant abuses.
              I now beg leave to consider this portion of Colonel Trevor’s argument some­
           what more fully in the light of recent events and my own personal knowledge of
           Bahrain and its ruler.
              3.  The removal of a cause of anti-British agitation in Persia in regard to the
           grievances of Shiahs in the island was urged by the Foreign Office ns a strong'
           argument in favour of reform so long ago as July 1922 (vide your telegram 916-S.’
           of 11th July 1922). But.since then, even since Colonel Trevor wrote his despatch
           of the 27th January 1923, the Persian interest in Bahrain has gone far further
           than a campaign on behalf of .their co-religionists there. It is not a question for
           them now of getting abuses removed but of claiming sovereignty over the island.
           At no time, I venture to think, was thcro a genuine desire in Persia for the removal,
           of the inequalities under which tho Shiahs aro supposed to suffer in Bahrain. Tho.  t
           Persians in Bahrain arc in reality for the most part smugglers driven there by tho.
           establishment of the Customs on the Persian side of the Gulf. They arc in no way
           deserving of encouragement by Persia. The agitation on their behalf was ficti-.
           tious and it is highly doubtful if it would have been placated by reforms. On tho
           other hand, the Persian claim to Bahrain, h'owovor unreasonable it may bo, is a.
           serious claim ; it is being advanced, as the Government of India aro awaro, from
           many sides simultaneously, and I have no doubt whatever that any pro-Shiah re­
           forms we might succeed in forcing upon the Shaikh of Bahrain would nothavothcr.
           smallest effect towards reducing anti-British agitation and pressure in regard to
           that larger question. On the contrary, I am disposed to think that our active in-,
           troduction of reforms might have the very opposite effect by simply attracting,
           moro attention than ever to our own claims, and thus raise in an acute form tho,
           issuo which I understand His Majesty’s Minister is particularly anxious to avoid
           at present. If the placating of Persian hostility is a principal object of reform
           in Bahrain, then it would seem as if a large part of tho foundation of that policy
           lias already disappeared.
              4.  The other consideration which encouraged Colonel Trevor to proposo tho*
           introduction of tlicso reforms was tho hopo that (it any rate some definite goqd
           would result, and a stain on our good name—inevitably associated with the stato
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