Page 359 - Records of Bahrain (3) (ii)_Neat
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Reforms and unrest, 1923 775
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obstructionist, utterly opppsed to all progress, is perhaps not so certain as some
* of his actions would lead ono to suppose. I understand from Sir Arnold Wilson
that the Shaikh has porpnnlly expressed to him his eagerness to enter into an
agreement with the Anglo-Pcrsian Oil Company for an Oil Concession and negotia
tions to that end arc now progressing satisfactorily. But this merely omphasi/cs
his deep suspicion of any suggestion of change or reform which comes from, or whicli
ho imagines to be supported by the British Government. Force therefore will
almost certainly have to be used to induce him to carry out such a very unpalatable
fichomo of administrative reform. But the probable consequences go further, •
I think, than Colonel Trevor could have foreseen, in the light of the fresh and •
intensive Persian agitation about the status of Bahrain whicli I have already
referred to. I regard it ns more than likely that the Persian Government may force
the issue ol Bahrain before long, and challenge our claims in Bahrain before the
League of Nations. If that should happen, our caso will be seriously prejudiced by
our having coerced and probably deposed the ruler, an old man with not many
more years of life, and in addition—for wo shall not be able to stop at his deposition
- turned out his son Abdulla and his wife, Abdulla’s mother. 'J’ho sympathies of
the whole of Sunni Islam will be aroused more especially ns the reforms arc par
ticularly aimed at Sunni privilege : and Bin Saud—who hus already given expression
to his concern at the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain— will be antagonized ;
and that at a time when, with the departure of Sir Percy Cox, the only man who has
any influence over him, and the removal of his subsidy, he will be particularly
diliicult to handle. It seems then that the forcible introduction of these reforms
(and I do not see how they can be introduced otherwise than by force) will seriously
compromise our claims to Bahrain by dragging in side issues, and by antagonizing
Sunnis and Wahabis who arc not really parties to the dispute.
0. The upshot of my i. •ument is that the dangers far outweigh any advantages
which the policy of reform may at one time have been supposed to possess : that
regarded by themselves, end apart from any question of expediency at.the moment,
the measures proposed either go further than seems really necessary—as in the ease
of taxation—or not far enough, as in the ease of the largo problem of Pearl Trade
reform which, I venture to think, should be taken up at leisure and as a whole.
I do not think there is any need for hurry : on the contrary, T beg to urge that
there is every reason why we should go slowly. Our position in Bahrain is being
seriously attacked at the present moment. 1 cannot think that it is expedient
that wo should select t-Ju’s particular time for drawing the attention of the whole
Islamic world to our activities in Bahrain by embarking on tin’s embarrassing
business of compulsory reform. If and when the agitation in Persia has died
down, or the question been definitely settled in our favour, the position will be
unambiguous and our task comparatively simple. Another reason for dolay is SA; A IV;
the age of Shaikh Isa himself. lie was born in 1840, and is now therefore 75 years ;
old. He cannot live much longer. For every reason, as ColonclTfevorlmnsclf ’
pointed out, the easiest solution is the introduction of necessary reforms by his heir
and successor Hamad, as the condition of his recognition by us. Thcro would be
an enormous advantage if theso changes could be introduced by tlio ruler of his
own accord—especially such as seem to attack Sunni interests. There will be an I
equal disadvantage if they arc imposed on Shaikh Hamad after tho forciblo depo
sition of his father. His position from the first will bo almost impossible in such
circumstances.
.
I am sanding copies of this despatch, and of tho immediately preceding cor-
rcspondcncc to llis Majesty’s Minister at Tehran, and tho Colonial Secretary.
- P,S.—As tho abovo lottcr is sent to tho copyist, I havo frcccivcd telegram
1/m3 No. 00-C., dated 10th May 1923, from tho Political Agent, Bahrain, which reports
another serious fanatical outburst between “ Alckwan ” Ncjdis and Persians.
I do not consider it necessary to alter ono word of tho foregoing despatch as a
consequence. The outburst merely emphasizes the acuto and pressing danger of
Wahibism, before which Persian claims and reforms recede into insignificance.
(Id.) S. G. IC.
O. M. Prow, Siuila—No. MCI32 F,D,-23.G.23-2l—K.C.M.