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Chapter XIII.                   241
             wo havo chiefly to look and, so regarded, a hostilo fort at Fao oomplotoly fulfils its assumed
             contoinplatod objeotfl, io., it givet to its occupier the command of the traffic to Mohammtrah,
             whence leads the most direct route to Tehran and the future railway terminus of any line con­
             necting Tehran with the head of the Persian Oulf, and thereby controls British trade with
             Mesopotamia and Arabistan. Its mere erection and arming is a matter to be deplored, inas­
             much as its existence must occasionally cause our remonstrances, unfortunately so often necessary
             to be met by evasion, and perhaps even with sovereign contempt, and may cause an injudicious
             commander to bring on set ious political complications and stoppage of trade until such time as
             Britain either strengthened the Persian Gulf gun-boats sufficiently to silence the fort, or until
             diplomatic action led to an ephemeral agreement likely to be again broken when occasion of
             resentment arose.
                "No Persian boats, worth mentioning, use either ohanncl, and a fort at Fao is less threat­
             ening to Persia than ono opposite to Mohammerah would be. The Bahr-ul-Mushir chaunel is
             always good onougli for Persian craft, and old forts exist in moro than sufficient numbers, or
             could bo readily improvised to mcot all eventualities likely to ariso between Turkey and
             Persia.
                “The description given of the Shat-el-Arab from tho bar to Mohammerah will serve to
             indicate that the fort is not built as an express mcnaco to tho town of Mohamraorah* and
             therefore as a direct monace to Persia. It is SO miles below Mohammerah.”
                 313. In submitting this memorandum to tho Secretary of State, the Gov­
                                           ernment of India wrote (Despatch No. 82-
                       Ibid, No. 321.
                                           E., dated 2oth May 1888):—
                " Your Lordship will observe that the Fort commands the main channel of tho Shat-el-
             Arab, and will enable tho Turks to block, at least temporarily, all access to the Tigris. It will
             further give the 'l'urks the command of the traffic to Mohammerah and thereby control
             British trade with Mesopotamia and Arabistan.
                “ Wears of opinion that the erection of tho Fort is prejudicial to British interests ; and if
             Her Majesty's Government do not feel themselves in a position to demand that it should be
             domolished or abandoned wo would at least recommend that strong support should be given to
             any similar demands made by tho Government of His Majesty the Sbaii of Persia."
                314. Tho Iudia Office strongly endorsed this despatch in communicating
              External A., March 1683, Not. 238-283.   with the Foreign Offico. A strongly
              Ibid (No. 213).              worded remonstrance was then addressed
             by Lord Salisbury to tho Turkish Miuisterin London (Rustum Pasha), in which
            a clear account was givcu of the reciprocal engagements made by Turkey and
             Persia about building fortifications on either hanks of Persia, and the objection*
             to the Turkish proceedings were stated in tho sense of Lord Salisbury’s Despatch
                                           No. 82-E., dated 26th May 1888, above
                          Ibid.
                                           quoted. A similar remonstrance was
            addressed by Sir W. White to the Porte at Constantinople.
                316. The Porte replied on the 31st July 1888. A translation of the reply
            is given below
                " Wo have peraecd your note of reply 6tafciog that tho construction of fortifications at
            Fao is contrary to tho decision arrived at .when the treaty of Erzeroum was concluded, vix.,
            that no fortifications should bo made on the banks of the Shat-el-Arab and declaring that any
            modification of this dccisiou must be subject to the consent of the mediating powers. It is
            needless to explain that the agreement arrived at ou this subjoct was not a reciprocal under­
            standing, but Turkey at that timeiu hor own interests reserved to her own institution the right
            of constructing fortifications on those banks and brought about the engagement that so long
            as Turkey should not fortify the right bank of the river, Persia should abstain from building
            forts on her left bank. Now that Turkey has had forts made, Persia is roleased from her
            engagement and is also free to construct forts on her own ground and has no right to object.
            And this agreement being between tho two Governments there is no kind of engagement vis-a-
            vis the mediating powers, and the two Governments aforesaid aro not dependent on their
            consent and the construction of these works is no violation of any treaty between the two
            countries."
                316. As the Turkish Government was determined to proceed with the work
                                          of the fortifications Sir H. D. Wolff
                     Ibid (No. 389}.
                                           urged that a British squadron of some
            strength should visit tho Persian Gulf, iu ordor to give an impression of the
            naval powor of England, and Lord Salisbury bclioved that such a visit would
            bo advantageous in several ways. But at that junoture it would be likely to
            increaao tho irritation felt at St. Petersburg on account of tho opening of the
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