Page 85 - Gulf Precis (VI)_Neat
P. 85
Chapter III- G3
dicncv, and ho acknowledged that the Jfonitfik Sheikhs, now fully alive to the effect which
His Excellency's policy must luvo upon their position, but- con«ci<»m of his inability, or rather
unprepared ness, to enforce it, and n-suiniug, therefore, the absence of superior sanction, had
momentarily suspended thoir rivalries in order to gain a common object. On this point,
indeed, His Excollt-noy himsolf suggested that bis time bad bi-cn ill-chosen, seeing that a
part of their plan being (as in the case of tho opposition of Wadee Jitfj in 185*2) by mero
passive assistance to prolong tho crisis in the hope of compelling bis recall to Constantinople 5
tho immediate iequipments oT the telegraph and His Excellency's engagement to supply grain
to Jeddah, which might othorwiso fall through seemed to them to furnish the means to
tho end.
I ventured to submit that, under the conditions and circumstances above stated, no
alternative remained lo IIis Excellency (were it only ns a temporary mcasuro.) but to make tho
concessions i-cces-ary lo restore order; and as the same state of things was obviously existnnt
at the peri* d «»f Sheikh Ahtmoor'a defection, while oviryday's delay added to bis embarrass
ment, I must regret that His Excellency did not then and without reserve fulfil his inten
tion of appointing Sh«*ikh Fnhud upon the terms propos'd, rather than compound with rebellion
by making overture to Sheikh Faaair, This ourse I thought was still the one which entailed
tho least sacrifice of dignity, for although 11 is Excellency had continued to cherish the hope
that he miirlu- bo able, as tho condition of invcsliiuro, to retain the lauds servered from the
Monte Ilk torritoiy, ho admitted that, the former Chief had steadily rejected such a condition,
while tho latter, being still at Baghdad and fearing to speak out had coupled with its accept
ance a proviso that ho should not bo held responsible for the disturbances, which lie affirmed
would certainly un-mo, but which, following the example of his brother, it was clear he
would himself foment, not only as the nvatis, indirectly, of effecting his purpose, but as a plea
also for excusing the short payment of tribute.
In advocating the nomination of Sheikh Fnhud, a man whom I had never met, but
who was described as being not loss popular with the dominant Monlcfik families than bis
rivals, I observed that ilis Excellency would at lea«t avoid the appearance of yielding
lo intimidation, and whether hereafter it was determined at Constantinople to maintain tho
administration of the M«»w*fik districts upon its original looting, or eventually to give effect
lo tli<* policy of His Excellency, the selection of a person wh > had thus far acted a passive part
must be attended with certain advantages. In the one ease the least amount of cncouiage-
raent would have bean afforded to successful rebellion ; in the other timo would bo gained
for maturing the plans of G •vernment and for preparing the way for a military expedition,
while supported by the* pre*iigc of the Sultan's authority would suffice, 1 believed, without
risk of defeat, if not without bloodshed, to bear down all opposition.
1 thus pointedly alluded to the direct action of the Central Government, because it
alone, 1 was of opinion, would convince recusant Chiefs of the futility of resistance, as
it alone would rc-issure friendly adherents, and because, as 1 reminded Ilis Excellency on
the occasion of Sheikh Mumoor's appointment t»» be Knim Mukum, His Excellency had led
me to believe that his proce* dings were sanctioned by the Porte. Were Sheikh Euhud
invested, the fii6t net of that Chief, like his predecessor, would probably be to require the
removal of Sheikh Naasir and Muusoor fiom the limits of his jurisdiction, a measure which
under certain conditions, would be not hss easy of accomplishment to the Government, than
it proved on the occasion of a similar application from Sheikh Bunder. These Chiefs should,
of course, be warded that by their past conduct they had forfeited every claim to future em
ployment; but considering their power for mischief, every inducement should be afforded them
to come and rcsido at Baghdad, to which end it would be necessary, doubtless, that formal
guarantees should be given, confirmed, if need be, from Constantinople, for the security of thoir
persons and property inclusive of th**ir large landed e-tates on the Shat-el-Arab. Did they
accept these cordifiups. vbey would tlicnco forward be iu safe keeping and powerless to
thwart the policy of Government, whatever might be the direction given to it by the Porte;
did tlioy reject ti.em, their disobedience would during them into conflict with the titular Chief,
who should be empowered, of course, to confiscate their estates, and who, as the Government
norairee, ami supported by troops would have little difficulty in suppressing them.
As tho result of our conference, His Excellency observed that my agreements ware
certainly justified by the course of events, but that he was still most loth to revoke an act—the
separation of tho lands from Montofik territory—to which he had formally committed himself
he would, however, again consult his Mujlis and acquaiut mo with the result.
On my referring again to the advanced state of the season and the continued deten
tion of our boats at Bus&omh, somo of which could not reach tficir respective destinations under
2U and 26 days, and recapitulating the circumstances which appeared to me to render prescufc
concession unavoidable, the subject was dropped.
I
No. 16, dated tie 22ad March 1864.
From—Colonel A. B. Kbudall, c.b., Her Majesty*! Cousul-Goneral ot Baghdad, !
To—The Hon’dlb E. M. Euscinr, IIoi Majesty's Churgd d'Aftaiios, Constantinople.
Namik Pasha on the 10th instant informed me that ho had resolved to nominate Futiud-
cl-Alee to the Sboikhship of the Mote file tribes, and
Jtid.
on the saiuo night His Excollency dispatched a
6teamer with the Buyurdldi and flag of investiture.