Page 89 - Gulf Precis (VI)_Neat

Chapter III. 07

No. 37, dated Lko 13lh July 186-1.
From—Colonel A. 13. Kbudail, c.b„ Her Majesty's Consul-Gonorftl at Digdad,
To—Ilia Exckilknct thr Rioiit IIon'dlk Sin II. L. Uolwbb, c.t.d., Ilor Britannic Majesty’s
Ambassador, Constantinople.
The expedition which, as reported in my last despatch, had boon ordered by Namik Pasha
to proceed from Diwanich to relievo Sumawoh,
Political A., September 1801, Noa. 103-10-1.
has sustained a severe defeat at tho hands of
the Arabs. Tho infantry portion, consisting of 350 Riflemen, with three guns, embarked in
boats ; after losing more than half of its number, including Been Bnsheckol Aghasec and most of
ils ofliccrs, was so completely dispersed, that up to the date of the last ccounts, a week after tho
event, only 00 men, of whom 30 wounded, had succeeded in reaching Diwanich. Shu Mi Pasha
travelling by land with the cavalry and Arab contingent (derived from the Zubeid, Booj, and
Jcboor tribes), arrived noar the scene of action on tho following morning, but was compelled to
retreat boforo tho superior force of tho onomy.
Shubli Pasha, in writing to Bagdad for reinforcement, justifies the rashness with which
lie exposed so small a detachment in a comparatively helpless position to the attack of overhclm-
ing numbers by the assurance that the Beni llacheym and Aiboo Uossein who opposed its advance,
had hitherto shown themselves friendly to Government, and had even promised n contin­
gent from their tribes to co-operate with him against Sheikh Munsoor ; aud that their collision
with the Sultan's troops had been occasioned, not by any chango of feeling on their part, but
by their enmity towards Murdnn Effendi, the farmer of tho district, who had incurred their
animosity, and whom, being under the escoit of the troops, the commander, of course, refused
to surrender into their hands. lie has accordingly thrown tho blame of the disaster upon this
officer, not only for permitting Murdan Effendi to accompany him from Aboojuwarccd, but for
continuing his progress in spite of the warning which he states was conveyed t<> him, that tho
Arabs had assembkd in force to attack him. This view having been adopted by Namik Pasha,
reinforcements have now been sent under the command of Fetik Hafiz Pasba to punish the
rebels, and, if practicable, to relievo the beleaguered garrison of Sumawoh. It is notorious,
however, that Sheikh Saadoon, one of the principal Chiefs of the Be in Ifachemy, is at present
associated with Sheikh Munsoor, that both of these Chiefs arc maintaining an active corrospond-
ence witb Sheikh Mootluk, the Chief of the Khusal and that the Aiboo Uossein, though not
located within tho limits of the territory under the control of Sheikh Monthik, are, as weaker
neighbours, certainly amenable to his influence in almost an equal degree with the tribes who
^ acknowledge themselves u his subjects."* If,
* ™cy c,v#-n 10 tcr.Tlin T.urki? Rcp0-U' therefore, it should prove that the Sheikh of the
bni Leon repeatedly attempted without iuccc»«. Ho Khuzal} yielding iO the counsels of Sheikh Jllun-
pay* a modcrato tribute, but refuses to rondcr lioiusgo soor or suspecting some design upon his own indc-
in pcrion. 1 pcndence, has instigated this new revolt, prepared
7
himself hereafter to support the rebels, I apprehend that the force under the command of Hafiz
Pasha will be found inadequate to the restoration of tranquility, and that, of the policy of coer­
cion initiated by Namik Pasha is to be persisted in, additional troops must be sent to this pro­
vince to give it effect. Rumours are abcady rife of disturbances in other quarters and of Sheikh
Munsoor having again crossed into Mesopotamia, but they have not aa yet been authenticated.
Of tho three guns which fell into tho hands of the Arabs, two have been brought back to
Diwanich by a small tribe of Syed whose abode is situated near the scene of the engagement;
the third is said to have been conveyed to Sheikh Munsoor’s camp, but being useless to Arabs,
I incline to think that its non-restitution is more probably to be attributed to its submersion
in the river, or to its transport being otherwise rendered impracticable. I should mention here
as an incident of the Montt-fig rebellion that Sheikh Munsoor was at an early stage joined by
Osman Beg, formerly Mudeer of Sumaweh and a defaulter to the treasury, who, on his super­
session in office, sought this means of evading his liabilities. From bis capacity and position
little importance is due to this man's dofcction, but he is reported to have been very active of
late in directing the operations of the Arabs, to
Osman Beg is the son of tho lato Mahomed Pasha whose cause a certain degree of prestige must accrue
Injch Ueyrabilar, for many ycare Governor of Mosul.
from his adhesion.
As regards the telegraph, despairing now, after nearly a year’s trial, of the ability of
Namik Pasha to open the way for its construction, I believe that one of the only courses loft to
the Porte to effect this object is either that I should be permitted at length to act independ­
ently aud to negotiate directly with the Arabs for a safe conduct, or that a campaign should
be undertaken and vigorously prosecuted with a sufficient force to subdue the districts on
either banks of the Euphrates from Diwanieh to the sea. I adhere to the conviction 1 have
uniformly expressed, that with the good will of the Turkish official British Agents dealing
directly with the Arabs would experience no difficulty in carrying out the undertaking. But
under Namik Pasha's rule the proposed policy would be certainly impracticable. The occur­
rences at Fao on the occasion of tho lauding of the cable have served to illustrate the extreme
jealousy of His Excellency at anything like independent action on our part, and your Excellen­
cy is aware that every offer from mo to place myself in communication with the revolted Chiefs
personally or by letter, with tho view of furthering our telegraphic purposes to induce their
submission to Turkish authority, has been systematically rejected on the ground of His Excel­
lency’s aversion to every form of Foreign intervention; nor in a patriotic point of view, perhaps
could His Excellency be blamed for preferring tho seoond course to which I have referred, but
it»i adoption would occupy time, and would probably ontail a greater sacrifice of revenue and a
greater substantivo outlay than tho Porte would be willing to incur.