Page 16 - Historical Summaries (Persian Gulf - Vol II) 1907-1953

Political Resident as Chairman.(,:) Its functions were to plan for (a) all matters
affecting the internal security of the Persian Gulf area whether in normal times or
in a general emergency and (b) all those measures which in a general war
emergency would primarily be the responsibility of the civil power.(M) In 1952 a
Military Adviser was appointed to the staff of the Political Resident.!“) He was
subsequently given an independent command (chapter 2, paragraph 117).
8. Under an arrangement made soon after the First World War, which is
known as the Welby Agreement, expenditure in the Persian Gulf was to be divided
equally between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India except
with regard to Bahrain and Muscat, which were to be supported by the Government
of India. The latter sought a revision of this arrangement in 1937 in connection
with the contemplated transfer of the Residency but their proposals do not appear
to have been accepted.(1C) One result of the arrangement is that when His Majesty’s
Government assumed control of the Gulf posts in 1947 the Bahrain Agency and
Muscat Consulate buildings and half the Kuwait Agency building were the
property of the Government of India. The Bahrain Agency building has since
collapsed and it is proposed to demolish it. No final settlement has yet been
reached with the Governments of India and Pakistan regarding these and other
assets which His Majesty’s Government took over when the control of the Gulf
ports was transferred.(lT) It was at one time feared that the Government of India
might claim the right to occupy the buildings, especially the Muscat Consulate,
but no such claim has yet been made.

II.—General Policy with regard to the Shaikhdoms
9. In 1939 Sir Trenchard Fowle, when he had been Political Resident for
nearly seven years, wrote as follows: “ Our ‘ rule ’ over the Arab States of the
Gulf rests on the goodwill of the Rulers and their peoples........... This goodwill
depends on three main factors. First—the fact that as far as possible we
let the Rulers and their people, under our guidance and advice, manage
their own affairs in their own way. Second—the fact that in our various
negotiations with the Rulers, in which of course their peoples are interested, on
the subject of oil, air facilities and so forth, we give them a patient hearing and
a square deal. Third—and most important—the Rulers and their peoples realise
that it is only His Majesty’s Government who protect them from absorption by
their stronger neighbours.”(1')
10. In 1948 His Majesty’s Government, after taking over full responsibility
of the Gulf States, had to decide whether—
(a) to continue the policy of not intervening except when compelled, or
(b) to introduce a policy of more direct administration approaching the
colonial model, or
(c) without introducing colonial methods to intensify their efforts to promote
good administration, social progress, and economic development
through the existing Rulers and administrative machinery, largely by
means of British advisers and technicians in the service of the Rulers.
They chose the last course.(,#)
11. In 1951 His Majesty’s Government expressed the following views on the
policy to be followed in dealing with the Shaikhdoms: —
(i) The practical possibility of achieving any form of general political
federation of the Shaikhdoms (as opposed to a local federation of the
Trucial States) is remote. The Rulers should, however, be encouraged
to consult together on matters of regional concern such as education
and health.
(,a) P.R. toF.O. 1094/8 G of June 9. 1951 (EA 1195/4/G of 1951).
(") ££toE°* I°^4/6l G of November 28. 1951 (EA 1195/ 10/G of 1951).
O f£-t0_£•!?• 1094(3)/6/92 G of August 22, 1952 (EA 1193/ 18/G of 1952).
( ) 1*0* to F.O. P.Z. 7846/37 of March 16, 1938 (E 1522/461/34 of 19381
(") (XC01/85/25/52 of 1952.) ''1
II!! £5-toF a 113 of July 19. 1948 (E 10151/605/G of 1948).
C ) F-O. to P.R. H 8863/605/G of July 2. 1948.