Page 198 - Gulf Precis (VII)_Neat

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In the present instance, seeing how decidedly, and I bclivc wisely, Her Majesty's
Government deprecate any dismemberment of Persia, seeing how mischievous an example
would be given to Russia in dealing with the subjects of Persia, and having regard to the
future embarrassment which we should lay up for ourselves, I am of opinion that the enlist­
ment should not take place,
I fear it is impossible to contend confidently that although we should effect a dismem­
berment for the moment, we should be able, upon the re-establishment of peace, to restore
to the Persian empire its integrity. This, when we have once fanned the flame of rebellion,
may be beyond our power, unless indeed we should be prepared hereafter to coerce into
re-subjection to the Shah, the tribes of whose aid in the field we wish to avail ourselves :
and such a course is not to be thought of.
It must be remembered that enlistment into our ranks, and submission to the discipline
and command of our officers, implies a service in a great degree voluntary, and of a nature
far more offensive to the Persian Government than those smaller services which, as a
matter of necessity, and for the sake of subsistence and self-defence, an invading army is
compelled to exact.
Such a service as enlistment into the British army is not, I apprehend, contemplated
in Article VII of the draft of the proposed treaty between Her Majesty and the Shah, lately
received from the Secret Committee of the H. C., which stipulates for an amnesty in favor
of those who, from fear of damage to themselves and samilies, have afforded “ supplies and
different kinds of service to the invading forces, whom they were unable to resist.”
The inhabitant of an invaded country may plead with truth that he is compelled by
fear to surrender his stock, and his substance, and even to give information and some degree
of aid to the enemy ; and the offence is one for which amnesty may reasonably be required
from the Government when peace is made. But I do not see how this plea could be put
forward by large bodies of warlike men, well able to escape from serving us, even if they
could not resist us.
Nor do I see that we could support the plea if they adduced it.
It is also to be observed that in this war with Persia we have no interest in common
with the Persian tribes. There is no common cause of quarrel, no sympathy except in
hostility to the Persian Government. When the Shah shall concede our demands, the
Bakhtiarf and the K'Ab tribes will reap no benefit from our success.
They will have received our pay (if we enlist them) but nothing more; we have no
thoughts of exacting from the Persian Government any concessions to them, if indeed we
know what they desire. They may be supposed to seek the permanent weakening of the
Shah’s authority in a portion at least of his own dominions, and so far our object is opposed
to theirs, not in unison with it. There is certainly no political bond between us. They
would be our mercenaries, not our allies, in a cause, and I think there are grave objections
to taking our mercenaries from the Shah’s own subjects.
As to the future, the fierce denunciations which the Persian authorities have issued
against all who allow the invaders to obtain the smallest article of supply, might lead to the
conclusion that we should not compromise the future safety of the Shah's subjects to any
greater extent by taking them into active military service, than by trafficing with them.
But it is scarcely possible that this should be so. There is, notwithstanding the big
threats of the Persian Commander, a real and wide difference between the two kinds of aid ;
and if the opportunity and power of punishing a tribe for taking up arms in the British
ranks should present themselves to the Shah’s Government, it is not to be supposed that
the vengeance would not be sharper and more determined than if the offence should have
been the mere sale of provisions or camels.
Possibly the Bakhtiarf and K’Ab tribes may be strong enough to defend themselves
unaided against the ultimate consequences of their junction with the British force, but it is
not to be expected that this will lead them to forego their claim to protection from us.
If we meet that claim by requiring that they shall be included in the amnesty, we must
watch the observance of that amnesty in regard to them with more than usual care, and we
must be prepared to enforce it.
Our obligatious to the men who had stood in the ranks with our own soldiers would not
be light We should owe something more to them than to the peasants who had supplied
our camp, and our debt would be greater from the fact that they would have gained nothing
by the success to which they would have contributed.
Upon the whole the enlistment of tribes from within the Shah’s dominions, and whom
we must acknowledge to be under his rightful authority, appears to me to Jead directly
to the future protectorate of a portion of his subjects. An embarrassing condition of things
at best, and one which in this instance would be of the worst example to Persia’s neigh­
bours.
It is impossible not to foresee with Sir James Outram that an important means of
success will be lost by abstaining from using the aid in arms, of those subjects of Persia
who are hostile to its Government. But probably it is not necessary that their assistance
should be entirely foregone because we refuse to take them into military service, or that
unless enlisted into our ranks they should be actively opposed to us.